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The present Supreme Court has been noticeably unreceptive
to legal claims asserted by racial minorities. Although it is always possible to articulate nonracial motives for the Court's civil
rights decisions, the popular perception is that a politically conservative majority wishing to cut back on the protection minority interests receive at majority expense now dominates the
Supreme Court. In reviewing the work of the Court during its
1988 Term, The United States Law Week reported that "[a] series of civil rights decisions by a conservative majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court making it easier to challenge affirmative action programs and more difficult to establish claims of employment discrimination highlighted the 1988-89 term's labor and
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employment cases." 1 U.S. Law Week went on to cite seven decisions handed down that Term that adversely affected minority
2
interests.

During the 1988 Term, the Court invalidated a minority setaside program for government contractors and imposed the

heavy burden of proving past discrimination as a prerequisite to
the use of affirmative action remedies;3 it permitted an affirmative action consent decree to be attacked collaterally by white

workers who had chosen not to intervene in the Title VII action
giving rise to the consent decree despite their knowledge that the
Title VII action was pending;4 it increased the burden of proof
imposed on minorities who assert Title VII claims by requiring

minority employees both to focus their challenges on specific
rather than aggregate employment practices and to disprove em-

ployer assertions of legitimate job relatedness; 5 it adopted a narrow interpretation of the Reconstruction civil rights statute now
codified in 42 U.S.C. section 1981, holding that the statute did
not prohibit racial harassment of minority employees by their
employers; 6 it held that discrimination claims filed against mu-

nicipalities under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 could not be based
upon a theory of respondeat superior;7 it held that the statute of

limitations for Title VII challenges to discriminatory seniority
systems began to run when a seniority system was first adopted

rather than when its discriminatory impact later materialized in
the form of subsequent seniority-based demotions;8 and it held
1. Review of Supreme Court's Term: Labor and Employment Law, 58 U.S.L.W. 3065 (Aug.
8, 1989).
2. Id.
3. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). The burden of proof imposed
by the case is so heavy that it was not satisfied by the well-known history of racial discrimination
in Richmond, Virginia, see 109 S. Ct. at 723-24, or by the fact that in a city whose population
was 50% black, only 0.67% of the city's prime construction contracts had been awarded to black
contractors. See 109 S. Ct. at 714.
4. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
5. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
6. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
7. Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989). Jett was a discrimination suit in
which a white employee challenged his discharge by a black employer, but the holding applies to
suits filed by minority plaintiffs as well. In a separate decision, the Court also held that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, another Reconstruction civil rights statute, did not permit race discrimination suits to be
maintained against states as employers because states were not "persons" within the meaning of
the § 1983 prohibition on discrimination occurring under "color" of state law. Will v. Michigan
Dept. of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).
8. Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989). Although Lorance involved a
Title VII claim of sex-based discrimination, its holding applies with equal force to race-based
discrimination claims asserted under Title VII.
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that attorney's fees for a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII case
could not be assessed against a union that intervened in order to
defend the discriminatory practice being challenged. 9
For the time being, at least, Supreme Court adjudication appears to offer little hope for minorities seeking to protect their
legal interests from either public or private disregard. The Court
has responded to a conservative shift in majoritarian attitudes
about race discrimination by subtly incorporating contemporary
attitudes into the constitutional and statutory provisions that
govern discrimination claims. One could argue, of course, that
what we are witnessing is the proper operation of a complex and
sophisticated governmental process. That, consistent with a refined understanding of its constitutional function, the Court is
exhibiting a proper sensitivity to the evolving content of our fimdamental social values. That the same social sensitivity that
once permitted the Court to condemn segregation and permit
miscegenation now compels the Court to retard the rate at which
minority gains can be extracted from an increasingly disgruntled
majority. The problem, however, is that judicial review is not
supposed to work that way.
Under the traditional model of judicial review, the Court is
supposed to be above the inevitable shifts that occur in the prevailing political climate. Exercising the skills of reasoned deliberation, within the constraints of principled adjudication, the
Supreme Court is expected to protect minority rights from predictable majoritarian efforts at exploitation. The easy resonance
of U.S. Law Week's political account of last Term's decisions
reveals that no one really takes the countermajoritarian aspects
of the traditional model very seriously. The Supreme Court has
never sustained significant independence from the demands of
ordinary politics, and likely never will. What eludes consensus,
however, is an assessment of just how far the actual performance
of the Court diverges from the ideal of the traditional model, and
just how much significance that divergence ought to command.
This article postulates that the discrepancy between actual and
model Supreme Court performance is sufficient to preclude the
9. Independent Fedn. of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989). 'this adversely
affects minority interests by limiting the sources of funding available to compensate victorious

minority litigants for their attorneys' fees and by increasing the sources of opposition to minority
interests that may be represented in particular suits through the elimination of a potential cost of
participation.
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existence of any qualitative difference between Supreme Court
adjudication and ordinary politics.
Supreme Court adjudication is characterized most strongly
by the existence of loosely constrained judicial discretion. This
discretion may well render the Court incapable of withstanding
in any sustained manner the majoritarian forces that govern representative politics.
Indeed, far from serving the
countermajoritarian function envisioned by the traditional model
of judicial review, the Supreme Court can better be understood
as serving the veiled majoritarian function of promoting popular
preferences at the expense of minority interests. Rather than attempting an extended proof of this proposition, however, the
present article simply describes the phenomenon of veiled majoritarianism and provisionally assumes its validity in order to confront a more intriguing question.
The purpose of the present article is to consider what impact
the hypothesized failure of the traditional model should have on
constitutional theory in general, and on the strategies that minorities should develop in order to protect their interests in particular. It would initially seem that failure of the traditional
model should cause minorities to reconceive the Court as a political institution, and that minority political strategies should be
refined to take account of the Court's veiled majoritarian political function. However, more careful analysis suggests that, as a
practical matter, such a reconception is unlikely to have any discernible effect. Surprisingly, the validity or invalidity of the
traditional model of judicial review may simply be irrelevant to
the manner in which majoritarian political forces ultimately
choose to accommodate minority interests. The reconception,
however, may nevertheless be significant in more subtle ways
that permit minorities to escape the dependency role to which
they are assigned by the traditional model of judicial review.
Part I of this article considers the impact that judicial discretion has on the traditional model of judicial review, and that
model's reliance on the Supreme Court as the primary guardian
of minority interests. Part II argues that the interests of racial
minorities can be better advanced through the ordinary political
process than through the process of Supreme Court adjudication. Part III emphasizes that minority participation in Supreme
Court proceedings cannot ultimately be avoided and, accordingly, suggests a political model of the Court that minorities can
use in an effort to neutralize the Court's distortion of the polit-
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ical process. Part IV considers the risks associated with political
use of the Supreme Court. Finally, Part V concludes that the
veiled majoritarian nature of judicial review poses an insoluble
dilemma for racial minorities. Although the dilemma cannot be
resolved, minorities do possess the power to transcend it in a way
that may permit them to assume responsibility for their own
interests.
I.

MAJorTAR1AN JuDIcIAL REVIEW

The traditional model of judicial review, which emanates from the
Supreme Court decision in Marbury v. Madison,10 is premised upon
the belief that the Court is capable of performing its adjudicatory function in a countermajoritarian manner. The viability of this
countermajoritarian model ultimately rests upon the ability of doctrinal principles to constrain judicial discretion in a manner sufficient to
prevent domination of the judicial process by the majoritarian preferences embodied in the socialized values of individual justices. However, the level of judicial discretion inescapably entailed in the process
of principled adjudication seems to preclude continued adherence to
the countermajoritarian assumption. In fact, that discretion actually
implicates the Court in the majoritarian exploitation of minority interests, rather than permitting it to serve as the guardian of minority
rights. It is unnecessary to offer an extended argument supporting the
failure of the traditional model because, by provisionally assuming its
failure, ultimately one is led to the conclusion that the validity or invalidity of the traditional model is largely inconsequential.
A.

The TraditionalModel

The system of government envisioned by the Framers was designed
to operate in an essentially political manner. Influenced by the Enlightenment, the Framers understood the dangers of self-interest and
faction. In a democracy, individuals and groups motivated by a desire
to maximize their own welfare could be expected to form coalitions
whose aggregate power would permit them to abridge the liberty and
property interests of those who, because of their exclusion from the
coalition, lacked the political power to protect themselves. The Framers sought to protect these political minorities by establishing a system
of government in which the natural inclination toward self-interested
factionalism would check itself."
10. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
11. For a general discussion of the historical and political context out of which the Constitu-
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The Framers relied primarily on structural mechanisms. They

adopted a democratic form of government, designed around James
Madison's conception of republicanism, in which power was broadly
dispersed in the hope of permitting the formation of only transitory,
shifting majorities. Because today's majority perpetrators might be tomorrow's minority victims, the danger of retaliation created an incentive for factions to treat each other with deference. Accordingly, the
Constitution diffused power horizontally within the federal government through the doctrine of separated governmental powers and vertically between the state and federal governments through the doctrine

of federalism. Moreover, the establishment of distinct constituencies
for the president and each house of the bicameral legislature, staggered
terms of limited but different duration for each of the representative
bodies, and indirect election of a president who possessed the power to

veto legislative enactments all combined to minimize the concentra12
tion of power that factionalism requires in order to flourish.
Because the concurrence of diverse power centers was difficult to

secure, all governmental actions -

including tyrannical actions

-

were less likely to ensue. In addition, the allocation of jurisdiction
over most significant substantive matters to the states promoted a level
of decentralization that was conducive not only to the emergence of
qualified governmental leaders, but to optimal levels of citizen participation and civic virtue that would help to neutralize the threat of selfinterest. 13 The Framers likely contemplated judicial review as an ad-

ditional safeguard against the dangers of faction. 14 But in the begintion emerged and the objectives of the Framers, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77-88 (1980); THE FEDERALIST (H. Lodge ed. 1888); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10-21 (1lth ed. 1985); G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN &
M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-17 (1986) [hereinafter G. STONE]; L. TRIBE, AMERI-

CAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 1-17 (2d ed. 1988); Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REV. 275, 280-83 (1988);
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republicanism]; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 31-48
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups].
12. See generally G. STONE, supra note 11, at 1-17.
13. See generally id; Sunstein, Republicanism, supra note 11; Symposium: The Republican
Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493-846 (1988).
14. There is some debate about whether the Framers intended to give the Supreme Court the
power to invalidate the acts ofcoordinate branches. See P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN &

D.

SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 8

n.34 (3d ed. 1988). The prevailing contemporary view appears to be that the Framers did intend
to grant the Court the power to engage in such judicial review. See id. at 8-9; A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 15-16 (1962);
G. STONE, supra note 11, at 30. However, the Framers may well have contemplated a fairly
mechanical type of judicial review that entailed very little judicial discretion. See G. STONE,
supra note 11, at 31-33. The flavor of such review is captured by Justice Roberts' famous statement in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936):
It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or control the action of the
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ning, the protections for minority rights were primarily structural, and
they were expected to operate in a political manner.15
Over time, the structural safeguards began to erode. Ultimately,
the New Deal desire for economic recovery prompted the political
bodies to adopt, and the Supreme Court eventually to endorse, the
effective nullification of the Framers' primary precautions. The crea-

tion of administrative agencies, established with the conscious goal of
increasing governmental efficiency, seriously diluted separation of
powers protections while vesting the bulk of governmental power in
the executive branch.1 6 In addition, belief in the need for national solutions to national economic problems eliminated all meaningful subpeople's representatives. This is a misconception.... When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial
branch of the Government has only one duty, - to lay the article of the Constitution which
is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares
with the former.
297 U.S. at 62-63, quoted in G. STONE, supra note 11, at 32. Many people question whether such
nondiscretionary review is realistically possible. See, eg., Barnett, ConstitutionalInterpretation
and JudicialSelf-Restraint, 39 MICH. L. REv. 213, 227 (1940). Indeed, there is doubt about
whether Justice Roberts intended the mechanistic sentiment often attributed to him. See Crrie,
The Constitution in the Supreme Court" The New Deal 1931-1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 504, 531
(1987). Skepticism about the Supreme Court's ability to engage in such mechanical review has
led commentators to undertake the herculean task of developing theories of judicial review that
comport with democratic principles. See G. STONE, supra note 11, at 31-38 (presenting several
such theories).
15. The strength of this proposition is evidenced by the fact that the Constitution was drafted
and ratified without a bill of rights that could guide legislative deliberations and serve as a basis
for judicial review. Although the desirability of a bill of rights was forcefully asserted during the
ratification debates, see G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 406; L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 4 n.7,
forceful opposition was also articulated on the grounds that the structural safeguards made a bill
of rights not only superfluous but also counterproductive:
[B]ills of rights.., are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would
even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on
this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For
why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?... [I]t is evident
that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that
power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be
charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not
given, and... [therefore by] clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations
concerning [the area of power exempted by the bill of rights] was intended to be vested in
the national government.
THE FEDERALISr, supra note 11, No. 84 (Hamilton), at 537; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at
4 n.7; G. STONE, supra note 11, at 115-22.
16. The Supreme Court has permitted administrative agencies to exercise legislative power,
see Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding
grant of policymaldng authority to administrative agencies); cf A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (last Supreme Court decision to invalidate grant of agency
power under nondelegation doctrine), and adjudicatory power, see Wiener v. United States, 357
U.S. 349 (1958) (upholding adjudicatory power of War Claims Commission), in addition to the
executive power granted to the president under the Constitution. In part to increase agency
efficiency, the Court has also upheld the constitutionality of independent agencies that operate
largely free of presidential control. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935). Moreover, in matters affecting foreign affairs, the powers of the president and the foreign
affairs agencies are essentially plenary. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding authority of president to impose fines for selling arms to foreign
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ject-matter restrictions on the scope of federal power. 17
As the Framers' structural safeguards diminished in importance,

the significance of Supreme Court protection increased. John Marshall laid the foundation for this enhanced judicial role in Marbury v.
Madison, where he characterized judicial review as essential to the

protection of individual rights from majoritarian abrogation.1 8 This
Marbury-based model of judicial review has both endured and flour-

ished over time, and the Supreme Court has now designated itself the
ultimate guarantor of constitutional rights. 19 Although the Framers
almost certainly did not intend to include racial minorities among the

political minorities who required protection, enactment of the Reconstruction amendments gave racial minorities specific new constitutional rights that could be exercised against the majority.20 This, in
turn, enhanced the significance of judicial review as a means of pro-

tecting racial minority interests. As a result, we have now come to
vest the Supreme Court, rather than the political process, with the
government). See generally Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV.
421, 430-52 (1987).
17. In upholding the limitations imposed on private agricultural production by the Agricul.
tural Adjustment Act - one of the pieces of New Deal legislation designed to ameliorate the
economic hardships of the Depression - the Supreme Court held that the power to regulate
interstate commerce under art. I, § 8, cl.
3 of the Constitution permitted Congress to regulate the
production of an Ohio farmer who grew wheat for his own consumption. Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942). Prior to the New Deal, such private production was viewed as inherently
local and therefore beyond the reach of federal regulation. Wickard has now come to stand for
the proposition that the scope of federal regulatory power is virtually limitless. See Sunstein,
supra note 16, at 430-52.
18. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). John Marshall stated that "[t]he
very essence of civil liberty ...consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury" and that "[t]he province of the court is, solely, to
decide on the rights of individuals .... 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163, 170. Although Marshall
stated that the protection of individual rights was important enough to require invalidation of the
acts of coordinate branches that abridged those rights, 5 U.S. (ICranch) at 177-78, in retrospect,
Marshall's actions ironically seem to have been motivated by political considerations. Rather
than being protected, Marbury's rights appear actually to have been sacrificed for partisan political gain. By denying Marbury his commission, Marshall was able to divert attention from his
true objective, which was to establish a power of judicial review that would enable the recently
defeated Federalist party to retain political power through its hold over the life-tenured judiciary.
See generally G. STONE, supra note 11, at 25-3 1. This detail, however, has not deprived the
decision of its symbolic significance as the harbinger of modem judicial review.
19. Cf Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (citing Marburyfor proposition that Supreme
Court "is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"). By reserving the right to
decide finally the meaning of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has also reserved the right to
decide finally the content of constitutional rights.
20. The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the U. S. Constitution were enacted during the Reconstruction period following the Civil War in order to give certain rights to
the newly freed former slaves and to authorize congressional legislation that might be needed to
enforce those rights. The thirteenth amendment, ratified in 1865, prohibited slavery. The fourteenth amendment, ratified in 1868, gave all persons, including former black slaves, the rights of
national and state citizenship, and guaranteed to such persons due process and the equal protection of the laws. The fifteenth amendment, ratified in 1870, gave blacks the right to vote.
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primary responsibility for protecting the interests of racial minorities
from disregard by the majoritarian branches of government.
Under the Marbury model of judicial review, the Constitution obligates the Supreme Court to nullify actions of the majoritarian
branches that impermissibly interfere with rights guaranteed to minorities by the Constitution. 2 1 In order to perform this function, however, the Court must possess the capacity to operate in a
countermajoritarian manner. To the extent that the Court is sub-

servient to majoritarian desires, it cannot effectively protect minority
interests from majoritarian exploitation. Accordingly, consistent with
the traditional model, judicial independence is promoted by both formal and operational safeguards.
Formally, the Court's insulation from political pressure is established through life tenure and salary protection. 22 To the extent that
the representative branches become concerned about the outcome of
particular cases, life tenure and salary protection are designed to assure judges that they will not be fired or punished financially for disregarding the wishes of the representative branches. 23 The safeguards
are also designed to insulate the judiciary from direct popular pressure
by freeing judges from the need to worry about their prospects for
reappointment or reelection, which might be jeopardized by the issuance of unpopular decisions. Realistically, the formal safeguards in
and of themselves do little to ensure judicial independence. Congress
and the president could circumvent those safeguards and impose political pressure on the Court in any number of ways. 24 However, even if
21. This judicial function is captured most crisply in the representation reinforcement model
of judicial review, which is described and developed in J. ELY, supra note 11. For more recent
variations of the traditional model, see R. BoRx, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARV. L. REv. 43 (1989).
I emphasize Supreme Court invalidation of coordinate branch actions for the sake of simplicity. Much of the Court's work admittedly involves the interpretation of federal and state statutes
and common law rules. Theories of judicial review that are relevant to Supreme Court constitutional adjudication can also have an important impact on the Court's statutory and common law
interpretations. For present purposes, however, Supreme Court invalidation of the acts of representative branches serves as an adequate foundation for the thesis that I wish to present.
Similarly, I do not dwell upon the differences between the role of the Supreme Court and the
role of the lower federal courts. There are differences, and for many purposes the differences are
significant. Again, however, I have focused on the Supreme Court for purposes of simplicity and
because Supreme Court adjudication is sufficient to illustrate the points that I wish to make.
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Framers rejected a proposed constitutional prohibition on
judicial salary increases. See 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 133-37 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner
eds. 1987).
23. Impeachment is an available form of retaliation by the representative branches but its use
may be too politically difficult to permit it to serve as the basis of a credible threat in typical
cases. See infra note 130.
24. Congress could cancel the Court's term for political reasons, as it did with respect to the
Court's June and December 1802 Terms. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 11. Congress
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life tenure and salary protection are viewed as instrumentally ineffeccould also cut the Court's budget, or refuse to appoint needed additional judges as it did in the
mid-1970s, when the Democratic Congress repeatedly declined to create new federal judgeships
until a Democratic president was elected to appoint the new judges. See Race Is On for 152 New
Judgeships, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 9, 1978, at 54.
To some extent at least, Congress could also restrict the Court's jurisdiction in order to coerce certain outcomes. The Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. In the past, Congress has threatened
politically motivated use of this power in a way that may well have influenced the Court's subsequent constitutional exposition. See generallyG. STONE, supra note 11, at 70-74, 493 (discussing
threatened use of power to regulate jurisdiction in various substantive areas including school
prayer, reapportionment, school desegregation, and abortion).
Congress could even manipulate the Court's personnel in order to affect Supreme Court adjudications. The most famous effort at personnel manipulation involved President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan. After the Supreme Court had invalidated several pieces of
New Deal legislation on constitutional grounds, President Roosevelt proposed legislation that
would expand the number of justices on the Supreme Court. The proposal called for one additional justice to be appointed, up to a maximum of 15, for each justice over the age of 70. In
1937, at the time that the proposal was made, six sitting justices were over the age of 70.
Although the legislation was nominally offered to ease the caseload of the older justices, it is
widely recognized to have been a politically motivated effort to "stack" the Court with justices
that would be receptive to future New Deal legislation. The court-packing plan generated significant opposition. Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson, howver, might have been able to
amass enough political support to secure enactment if he had not died of a heart attack shortly
before the vote on the proposed legislation. See generally Leuchtenburg, The Originsof Franklin
. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing"Plan, 1966 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 347.
In addition to the many methods that Congress could use to influence Supreme Court adjudications, the president could impose pressure on the Court by declining to give effect to its judgments. Thomas Jefferson threatened not to comply with Supreme Court directives affecting
questions that he believed the Constitution delegated to the president rather than to the Court.
See G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 22. President Lincoln also argued that the Dred Scott decision of the Supreme Court invalidating the Missouri compromise, see infra text accompanying
notes 85-95, should be limited to the parties before the Court and should not be followed as a
political rule by the representative branches. See id., at 23-24. In addition, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt was prepared to ignore any Supreme Court order that invalidated federal abrogation of "gold clauses" in federal obligations, thereby interfering with his New Deal economic
recovery objectives. Although Roosevelt's actions were probably not known to the Court at the
time that it upheld the government's power to abrogate gold clauses, subsequently acquired
knowledge of the President's intentions may have affected the Court's behavior in later cases.
See id at 24-25.
The president could also simply threaten to defy the Court's orders. The perceived unwillingness of President Andrew Jackson to enforce judgments of the Supreme Court favorable to the
Cherokee Indian Tribe appears to have affected the manner in which the Court chose to act in at
least one case. In 1827, the Cherokee Tribe declared itself an independent nation with complete
sovereignty over its tribal lands - lands the United States viewed as falling within the geographical boundaries of the State of Georgia. President Jackson responded to this declaration by asserting that the Cherokee must leave Georgia and move west in order to avoid the force of Georgia
sovereignty. Toward this end, Jackson signed congressional legislation setting aside land in the
territory west of the Mississippi River for the Cherokee Tribe.
As it became evident that the sovereignty dispute between Georgia and the Cherokee Tribe
would end up before the U.S. Supreme Court, Georgia governmental officials openly vowed to
disregard any Supreme Court judgment that questioned State authority to exercise sovereignty
over Cherokee lands. Moreover, President Jackson was perceived to be sympathetic to this position. The resolve of the Georgia officials was demonstrated when the State of Georgia proceeded
to execute an individual convicted of murder on Cherokee lands despite issuance by the U.S.
Supreme Court of a stay of execution pending Supreme Court review. When the Court was
formally petitioned to restrain enforcement of Georgia law over the Cherokee Tribe in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), the Court refused to reach the merits of the case.
While expressing sympathy for the plight of the Cherokee, the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdic-
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tive, they do convey a symbolic understanding of acceptable governmental behavior that might inhibit the representative branches from
imposing inordinately high levels of political pressure on the Court
and that might enhance the courage of the Court to resist whatever
pressures do come to be exerted upon it.
The traditional model also relies on the judicial tradition of principled adjudication to promote judicial independence. The Supreme
Court is able to perform in a countermajoritarian manner because of
both the conventions surrounding judicial decisionmaking and the
procedural context out of which judicial decisions emerge. The Court
operates by inducing general principles from texts and precedents and
then deducing from those principles proper resolutions of the particular cases with which it is confronted. Moreover, justices are selected
in part on the basis of their aptitude and temperament for "reasoned
elaboration, ' 25 and the legitimacy of judicial actions is determined by
the adequacy of the principled accounts that they offer for their adjudications. The doctrine of stare decisis under which the Court operates 26 is essentially an equality principle that requires like cases to be
treated alike. Consistent with this doctrine, a justice tempted to deviate from the governing principle in resolving a particular case would
be forced to hesitate before doing so for fear that an unprincipled decision today might bind the justice to reach a result that he or she would
not desire in some future case. In addition, the procedural due process
constraints that apply to the judiciary also promote principled decisionmaking. The stringent "record" requirements that the due process clause imposes focus the Court's attention on factors that are
relevant to the governing principle and divert the Court's attention
from extraneous political factors that have no proper bearing on the
principled resolution of a case. 27
In sum, the traditional model of judicial review posits a Supreme
Court that is capable of protecting minority interests from
tion to consider the case. See R CHUSED, A MODERN APPROACH TO PROPERTY 104-09 (1978);
Burke, The Cherokee Caser" A Study in Law, Politics and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500

(1969).
25. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 (Hamilton) (discussing importance of judicial judgment
and adherence to precedent).
26. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. CL 2363, 2370 (1989).
27. The due process clause provides procedural safeguards to individuals and minorities

whose lack of political power makes pluralist political safeguards unavailable to them. That is
why hearings and on-the-record decisions are essential in an adjudicatory context but are op-

tional in a legislative context. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (due process
requires hearing with respect to executive determinations, which affect small number of individuals) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (due
process does not require hearing with respect to legislative determinations, which affect large
number of individuals).
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majoritarian abridgement because it is able to operate in a
countermajoritarian manner. The validity of the countermajoritarian
assumption is, therefore, essential to the appeal of the traditional
model. To the extent that the countermajoritarian assumption fails to
hold, the Supreme Court cannot be relied upon to protect minority
interests from majoritarian abridgement.
B.

Veiled Majoritarianism

Close examination suggests that the countermajoritarian assumption of the traditional model cannot be valid. Because justices are socialized by the same majority that determines their fitness for judicial
office, they will arrive at the bench already inculcated with
majoritarian values that will influence the manner in which they exercise their judicial discretion. Accordingly, unless judicial discretion
can be reduced to acceptably low levels, justices can be expected to
rule in ways that facilitate rather than inhibit majoritarian efforts to
advance majority interests, even at minority expense. None of the
safeguards relied upon by the traditional model, however, can satisfactorily control judicial discretion. The formal safeguards of life tenure
and salary protection, which are designed to insulate the judiciary
from external political pressure, simply cannot guard against the majoritarianism inherent in a judge's own assimilation of dominant social
values. Moreover, the operational safeguard of principled adjudication has not proved capable of significantly reducing judicial discretion. In many instances, the governing substantive principles of law
themselves incorporate majoritarian values in a way that leaves the
Court with no choice but to acquiesce in majoritarian desires. In other
instances, the guidance available to the Court in selecting among potentially governing principles simply is insufficient to prevent the need
for recourse to judicial discretion in making the selection. In still
other instances, the ambiguities that inhere in a governing principle
even after it has been selected require recourse to the socialized values
of the justices. As a result, when the Court is called upon to protect
minority interests, it may merely be participating in the sacrifice of
those interests to majority desires.
Supreme Court justices are themselves majoritarian, in the sense
that they have been socialized by the dominant culture. As a result,
they have internalized the basic values and assumptions of that culture, including the beliefs and predispositions that can cause the majority to discount minority interests. 28 Indeed, a justice's sympathy
28. In the present context, the term "majoritarian" is an idealization. As a literal matter, a
Supreme Court justice is no more likely to reflect the views of the actual majority than is a
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toward majoritarian values is thoroughly tested by the appointment
and confirmation process, which is specifically designed to eliminate
any candidate whose political inclinations are not sufficiently centrist
for the majoritarian branches to feel comfortable with that candidate's
likely judicial performance. 29 As a statistical matter, therefore, a
Supreme Court justice is more likely to share the majority's views
about proper resolution of a given social issue than to possess any
other view on that issue. Moreover, to the extent that the justice has
been socialized to share majoritarian prejudices, he or she may not
even be consciously aware- of the nature of those prejudices, or the
30
degree to which they influence the exercise of the justice's discretion.
Whatever factors cause majority undervaluation of minority interests,
justices socialized by the dominant culture will have been influenced
by them too. Accordingly, a justice will come to the task of protecting
minority interests possessed by the very predispositions that they are
asked to guard against.
Because judges will have personal attitudes and values significantly
similar to those of the majority, judicial review cannot be expected to
protect minority interests unless something in the judicial process
guards against the influence of majoritarian preferences. The traditional model of judicial review assumes that the formal safeguards of
life tenure and salary protection, as well as the operative safeguards
attendant to the process of principled adjudication, can accomplish
president, a senator, or a member of the House of Representatives. The "majority" that matters
for present purposes is that segment of the electorate having the inclination and resources to
influence representative politics. The fact that many individuals are effectively disenfranchised in
the political process is so significant that it may ultimately render our operative vision of democratic government unappealing. The present thesis, however, expresses a type of skepticism
about the utility of judicial review that persists even if the assumptions of representative democracy are accepted as true.
29. The nomination by President Reagan of D.C. Circuit Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme
Court was not confirmed by the Senate largely because the nominee's political views were not
sufficiently within the mainstream of contemporary American political thought. See Greenhouse, Bork's Nomination is Rejected, 58-42; Reagan 'Saddened,'N.Y.Times, Oct. 24, 1987, § 1,
at 1, col. 3. Douglas Ginsburg, the successor nominee to Judge Bork, was forced to withdraw his
name from consideration during the confirmation process when it was revealed that his past
recreational drug use was not sufficiently within the mainstream of contemporary American
views about recreational drug use. See Roberts, Ginsburg Withdraws Name as Supreme Court
Nominee, Citing Marijuana 'Clamor,'N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, § 1, pt. 1, at 1, col. 6.
30. Professor Lawrence has emphasized that much racial discrimination is motivated by
prejudices that occur at a subconscious level. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and EqualProtection: Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REV.317 (1987). Indeed, the majority
culture can transmit prejudices so subtly and effectively that even members of the racial minority
being disadvantaged can come to adopt them. Unconscious racial prejudice may pose the bulk of
the problem to which judicial review is directed. Although extreme cases of majoritarian racial
discrimination may be motivated by malice or xenophobic dislike, the more typical discrimination case is one in which majoritarian policy formulators simply undervalue minority interests
because of misinformation conveyed through cultural stereotypes, inability to empathize, or mere
inattention. See J. ELY, supra note 11, at 157.
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this task. Contrary to this assumption, however, neither set of safeguards is likely to be effective.
Although the instrumental value of the formal safeguards is questionable, the symbolic value of those safeguards may prompt a justice
to resist majoritarian influences. Life tenure and salary protection,
however, are directed at the problem of majoritarian pressures exerted
by other branches of government. Accordingly, they may not prompt
a justice to guard against his or her own majoritarian attitudes and
values. Even if they do, however, and even if a justice makes strenuous efforts to compensate for his or her known prejudices, the justice
will still be vulnerable to those biases and predispositions that continue to operate at a subconscious level - the level at which most
noninvidious discrimination is likely to occur. As a result, the formal
safeguards of life tenure and salary protection, enhanced by any symbolic importance they may have, are simply inapposite to the problem
of majoritarian-influenced judicial values. A justice cannot be impartial simply by trying; majoritarian influences are too effective for such
efforts to be more than marginally successful. If the countermajoritarian assumption of the traditional model is to hold, it will
have to be through the constraints imposed upon judicial discretion by
the process of principled adjudication.
However well the constraint of principled adjudication should
work in theory, it simply has not worked well in practice. The
Supreme Court often adopts legal principles that expressly incorporate
majoritarian preferences into their meanings, and thereby provide no
safeguard whatsoever from majoritarian desires. Perhaps the most
celebrated example is the Court's ruling in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority,31 which held that the constitutional principle of federalism contained no judicially enforceable standards; the
majoritarian branches themselves were responsible for defining the
meaning of the constitutional standard. 32 Although that approach to
constitutional enforcement might make some sense in the context of
federalism, where the Senate arguably is capable of securing political
protection for federalism interests, the Court has issued similar rulings
in the context of race discrimination, where the very premise of the
traditional model is that racial minorities do not possess the power to
protect their interests in the political process. 33 In McCleskey v.
31. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
32. 469 U.S. at 547-52. The Court left open the possibility that judicially enforceable limits

might later be developed to govern unanticipated future circumstances. See 469 U.S. at 554.
33. See generally J. ELY, supra note 11.
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Kemp, 34

the Court rejected equal protection and eighth amendment
challenges to the imposition of capital punishment under a Georgia
statute where statistical evidence indicated that black murder convicts
were more than four times as likely to receive the death penalty if their
victims were white than if their victims were black. 35 In rejecting the
eighth amendment challenge, the Court held that the governing constitutional standard was to be given operative meaning through reference to the preferences of the state legislature 36 and the defendant's
jury. 37 Both the legislature and the jury are majoritarian institutions.
As a result, the Court's incorporation of the preferences of those insti-

tutions into the meaning of the constitutional standard had the ironic
effect of constitutionalizing the level of discrimination that exists in

the society at large. 38 In this sense, the Court seems actually to have
promoted rather than prevented majoritarian exploitation of minority
39
interests.
When a legal principle does have content that is not derived from
34. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
35. 481 U.S. at 286-87. More specifically, all individuals convicted of murder were 4.3 times
more likely to receive the death penalty if their victims were white than if their victims were
black. In addition, blacks convicted of murder were, overall, 1.1 times more likely to be sentenced to death than white convicts. Accordingly, blacks convicted of murdering white victims
were the most likely class of defendants to receive the death penalty, and the differences were
statistically significant. The raw data also showed that, prior to adjustment for nonracial factors,
the death penalty was imposed in 22% of the cases involving black defendants and white victims,
but it was imposed in only 1% of the cases involving black defendants and black victims.
36. 481 U.S. at 300. The language of Justice Powell's opinion is revealing. It states:
Thus, our constitutional decisions have been informed by "contemporary values concerning
the infliction of a challenged sanction." In assessing contemporary values, we have eschewed subjective judgment, and instead have sought to ascertain "objective indicia that
reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction." First among these indicia are the decisions of state legislatures, "because the... legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining" contemporary standards. We also have been guided by the sentencing decisions of
juries, because they are "a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values."
481 U.S. at 300 (citations omitted).
37. 481 U.S. at 310. The language of the opinion is again revealing. It states: "Thus, it is
the jury that is a criminal defendant's fundamental 'protection of life and liberty against race or
color prejudice.' Specifically, a capital sentencing jury representative of a criminal defendant's
community assures a 'diffused impartiality' in the jury's task of 'express[ing] the conscience of
the community on the ultimate question of life or death."' 481 U.S. at 310 (brackets in original;
citations and footnote omitted).
38. One way to conceptualize the decision is that the Court permitted whites to have the
increased deterrent and retributive benefits of a capital punishment statute even though the costs
associated with those benefits (concomitantly lower deterrence and retribution, as well as higher
execution rates) were disproportionately imposed upon blacks. Presumably, it is precisely such
undervaluation of minority interests that the traditional model was designed to prevent. See J.
ELY, supra note 11, at 157. For a general discussion of the McCleskey decision addressing this
and other aspects of the case, see Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, CapitalPunishment,and
the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1390-95 (1988).
39. Although the Court's express incorporation of majoritarian preferences may be rare, the
Court often achieves the same submission to majoritarian preferences through deferential standards of review. See, eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (using deferential rational
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the majoritarian branches of government, the ambiguities encountered
in both identifying and applying that principle eliminate any meaning-

ful constraint on judicial discretion. In a case of first impression, selection of the governing legal principle is necessarily an act of

unconstrained judicial discretion because the Court has no precedent
to which it may turn for guidance. 4° The Supreme Court's history in

choosing between intent and effects principles in discrimination suits
illustrates the problem. 41 One could rationally prefer either principle.
The basic argument in favor of focusing on intent is that a prohibition

on innocently motivated, neutral actions that simply happen to have a
racially disparate impact would unduly restrict the ability of governmental decisionmakers to use precise and efficient classifications that
are directly responsive to the merits of the regulatory problems with
which they are confronted. 42 The major drawback of focusing on in-

tent is that evidence of intentional discrimination often is difficult or
impossible to secure, thereby permitting acts of intentional discriminabasis standard of review to reject equal protection challenge to Washington, D.C., police officer
qualification examination despite racial nature of challenge).
Even when the Court decides to apply a heightened standard of review, there is a danger that
it will find that standard to be satisfied precisely when racial minorities are most vulnerable to
majoritarian abuse. See, eg., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding exclusion of Japanese-American citizens from certain areas of the West Coast after outbreak of World
War II despite racial basis of classification in environment of racial animus).
The Court has also used its array ofjusticiability devices to defer to majoritarian preferences
by declining to reach the merits of discrimination claims, as it did in dismissing a series of minority challenges to alleged patterns of governmental misconduct within the criminal justice system.
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);
Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). Theoretically, damage actions by individuals who had already been injured by the challenged practices
could serve as a basis for reaching the merits of the constitutional claims, although as a practical
matter, the success of such actions would likely be frustrated by the doctrines of official and
sovereign immunity. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989), holds that
such suits can now be maintained only against municipalities, with all of the difficulties attendant
to successful maintenance of such suits, or against a government official by seeking funds from
only the official's personal assets, which may well preclude such litigation from being cost-justified. Regardless of the ultimate viability of damage actions, however, the governmental misconduct cases do create the impression of a distinct reluctance on the part of the Court to reach the
merits of the constitutional challenges.
40. In all cases other than cases of first impression, the act of principle selection really
amounts to an act of principle application - the difficulties of which are discussed below. The
only way that the selection of a governing principle can be constrained is by some other principle
that controls the selection process. As a result, selection of the immediate principle, if not arbitrary, necessarily entails application of the metaprinciple.
41. This history is carefully detailed in Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 935 (1989) (ultimately suggesting that intent test is inappropriate as
sole test of unconstitutional discrimination because it often requires meaningless inquiries).
42. See Lawrence, supra note 30, at 320-21. It is sometimes argued that an intent test is
preferable to an effects test because the Constitution guarantees procedural regularity but not
particular substantive outcomes. That argument, however, merely states a preference for intent
over effects. It does not offer a justification for why the Constitution should be viewed as simply
a procedural document. In order to justify such a view of the Constitution, one would have to
fall back on the types of arguments that are made in the text.

June 1990]

Pure Politics

1987

tion to escape invalidation by masquerading as acts of neutral policymaking. The basic argument in favor of focusing on effects is that
harmful effects are harmful regardless of the intent with which they
are produced; the major drawback is that such a focus would require
governmental decisionmakers explicitly to consider race as a factor in
formulating social policy, thereby contravening the very principle of
43
racial neutrality embodied in our antidiscrimination laws.
In Washington v. Davis,44 the Supreme Court held that the applicable principle for equal protection clause purposes is the intent principle.45 Five years earlier, however, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,46 the
Court had expressly rejected the intent principle for Title VII purposes, finding that the desire of Congress to reach discriminatory effects as well as discriminatory intent was "plain from the language of
the statute." 47 How did the Court know that the intent-principle governed discrimination claims asserted under the equal protection clause
while the effects principle governed claims asserted under Title VII?
Although one might initially suspect that the drafters of the two provisions must have had different intents, no evidence supports such a suspicion. The drafters of the fourteenth amendment appear to have left
no hint of their views concerning which principle should apply to
equal protection claims - at least the Washington v. Davis Court cited
no such evidence in support of its "intent" decision. And contrary to
the Court's assurance in Griggs, 4 8 nothing in the language or legislative history of Title VII compels the adoption of an "effects" test for
statutory claims of discrimination. 49 The two decisions can be reconciled only on policy grounds. But the policy advantages and disadvan43. See id at 319-21.
44. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
45. 426 U.S. at 238-48. The holding of Davis has been reaffirmed in a number of cases,
including Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65
(1977), Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1977), and Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1985).
46. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
47. 401 U.S. at 429.
48. 401 U.S. at 431-32.
49. The language of Title VII provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees... in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (emphasis added). It is difficult to see how this language favors
effects any more than it favors intent. In fact, use of the phrase "because of" might well evidence
congressional contemplation of an intent test. Although the statutory language is not dispositive,
the Court failed to offer any legislative history in support of its effects construction. Moreover, in
arriving at its effects construction, the Supreme Court was required to reverse the district court
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tages associated with each principle, which have already been
discussed, seem equally present in both cases. There is no obvious
reason to suppose that the presence or absence or relative weight of

these policy considerations should vary with the constitutional or statutory nature of the underlying cause of action, and the Court offered
50
no nonobvious reason why this should be the case.

Not only was the Court's discretion in making an initial selection
between the intent and effects principles unconstrained, but after having made that initial selection, the Court deemed itself free to change
its mind when confronted with a mildly different factual setting. The

Court's most recent decision on the issue seems to defy all notions of
consistency and constraint. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,5 1
the Court held - consistent with Griggs - that the effects principle
governed Title VII challenges to the discriminatory use of subjective
employment criteria, but the Court also imposed a standard of proof
consistent with Washington v. Davis - that may well be more diflicult to meet than the burden of proving discriminatory intent.5 2 The

Court's effortless vacillation between intent and effects principles
reveals the absence of any meaningful constraint upon judicial discre-

tion that operates at the principle selection stage. Even if the Court
and the court of appeals, both of whom had read the statute to require intent. See 401 U.S. at
428-29.
50. One might be tempted to argue that Title VII's more expansive effects test could properly
be imposed by a politically accountable Congress, whereas the politically unaccountable Supreme
Court could not properly read such an expansive test into the meaning of the Constitution where
it would be immunized from congressional revision. This argument, however, posits the
majoritarian Congress, rather than the countermajoritarian Supreme Court, as the more effective
guardian of minority rights. Moreover, because antidiscrimination remedies can adversely affect
the interests of certain classes of white workers, who themselves might not be adequately represented in Congress, countermajoritarian Supreme Court intervention might be required to prevent Congress from utilizing an effects test for Title VII purposes. This, of course, is the subject
of the contemporary affirmative action debate.
51. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
52. More specifically, the Court held that statistical disparities in racial representation between various segments of an employer's work force could not alone establish the plaintiff's
prima facie case. The Court then went on to hold that the plaintiff in a disparate-impact subjective-standard case also had the burden of proving that particular employment practices, rather
than the cumulative effect of the employer's hiring and promotion policies, were the legal cause
of the disparate-impact of which the plaintiff complained. Finally, the Court held that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the challenged practices were not justified by business necessity, even though business necessity had traditionally been treated as an affirmative defense that
employers were required to prove in order to defeat a showing of disparate impact. See 109 S.
Ct. at 2121-27; 109 S. Ct. at 2128-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that even under the intent
test, the employer bears the burden of proving business justification as an affirmative defense).
The facts giving rise to the disparate-impact claim in Wards Cove, which included segregated
housing and dining facilities, were sufficiently egregious that the dissenters found them to "bear
an unsettling resemblance to aspects of a plantation economy." 109 S. Ct. at 2128 n.4 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); see also 109 S. Ct. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If facts egregious enough to
warrant such characterization are not sufficient to satisfy the Court's new effects test, it is difficult
to divine a meaningful difference between this new test and the traditional intent test.
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were constrained in its selection of governing principles, however, it
would remain largely unconstrained when called upon to apply the
principle that had been selected.
In theory, once a governing principle is identified, the principle
reduces the danger of judicial majoritarianism because the principle
rather than judicial discretion generates the adjudicatory result. This
theory, however, cannot work for two reasons. First, in order to be
generally acceptable, a legal principle must be stated at a high enough
level of abstraction to permit interest groups with divergent preferences to believe that their objectives can be secured by the principle.
This level of abstraction both precludes meaningful constraint and requires an act of discretion to give the principles operative meaning.
Second, the contemporary nature of legal analysis makes it unrealistic
to expect that even a precise principle can generate only one, consistent result. Since the advent of legal realism and its demonstration of
the linguistic and conceptual imprecision of legal principles, legal analysis has tended to consist of functional or policy analysis.5 3 However,
because we are ambivalent about most of the social policies that we
espouse, that ambivalence can cause a single principle to generate inconsistent outcomes.
The problem can be illustrated by considering the dilemma posed
by the state action principle. The Supreme Court has held that the
fourteenth amendment prohibits official acts of racial discrimination
but that it does not reach acts of private discrimination. 54 The apparent purpose in drawing this distinction is to isolate a sphere of personal autonomy in which private parties are free to exercise their
associational preferences free from state intervention, but to preclude
the state itself from expressing a preference for one race over another.
In Corriganv. Buckley, 55 the Court held that a racially restrictive covenant in a white property owner's deed could be legally enforced by
the state without offending the constitutional prohibition on official
discrimination. Presumably, the Court viewed the state as a neutral
actor making its legal enforcement machinery equally available to all
citizens without regard to their private associational preferences,
thereby advancing the purposes of the state action principle. Then, in
Shelley v. Kraemer,56 the Court changed its mind and held that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was unconstitutional,
53. This development is discussed at greater length in G. WHrrE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA
63-75 (1980).
54. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 14-15 (1883).
55. 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (dismissing appeal for want of substantial federal question).
56. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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because such enforcement facilitated private acts of discrimination and
thereby undermined the goal of official neutrality. In essence, the
Shelley Court inverted the perceived connection between the state action principle and its underlying policy objectives that had originally
been established in Corrigan. The problem of determining which is
the correct application of the state action principle is simply insoluble.
Because state acquiescence can always be recharacterized as state action, the meaning of the state action principle can only amount to a
matter of perspective, which inevitably will be colored in particular
contexts by our ambivalent social views concerning the competing policy considerations on which the principle rests. For present purposes,
however, it is sufficient to note that even after a legal principle has
been selected, vast amounts of loosely constrained judicial discretion
may still be needed in order to apply it.
Majoritarian preferences reside in the socialized attitudes and values of Supreme Court justices, and they find expression in the exercise
of judicial discretion. Although a justice may be prompted by the formal safeguards of life tenure and salary protection consciously to
guard against majoritarian influences, such efforts cannot be effective
against the unconscious operation of those influences. Moreover, the
operational safeguard of principled adjudication cannot guard effectively against majoritarianism because many legal principles incorporate majoritarian preferences into their meanings. In addition, the
ambiguity inherent in both the selection and application of governing
principles is too great to permit the principles to serve as meaningful
constraints on the exercise ofjudicial discretion. Rather than protecting minority interests from majoritarian abrogation, as envisioned by
the traditional model of judicial review, the Supreme Court appears
actually to serve the function of advancing majority interests at minority expense, while operating behind the veil of countermajoritarian adjudication. Assuming that the traditional model has in fact failed,
racial minorities must consider novel strategies to deal with the essentially majoritarian nature of the Court.
II. RACE AND POSITIVE POLITICS
Contemporary minority attraction to judicial review has been premised on the belief that the Framers' political safeguards against factionalism could not adequately protect the interests of racial minorities
who would effectively be under-enfranchised by their discrete and in-
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sular character. 57 Moreover, the substantial dilution of the structured
safeguards during the New Deal eliminated any effectiveness they may
have had initially. 58 Reexamination of these assumptions in light of
the majoritarianism inherent in judicial review, however, suggests
that, whatever their defects, the political safeguards hold more promise for contemporary racial minorities than continued reliance on judicial review. Part I of this article has suggested that Supreme Court
dispositions of legal claims will ultimately be governed by the
majoritarian-influenced personal preferences of the justices who consider those claims. This means that the judicial process is ultimately a
political process - preferences rather than principles will determine
outcomes. Accordingly, the appropriate minority response to such judicial majoritarianism should be a political response.
In light of the failure of countermajoritarianism, minorities could
rationally choose to forgo reliance on judicial review altogether and
concentrate their efforts to advance minority interests on the overtly
political branches of government. The Framers had faith in the ability
of pluralist politics to protect the minority interests with which they
were concerned. The political branches have historically done more
than the Supreme Court to advance minority interests, while the predominant role of the Court, consistent with its veiled majoritarian design, has been to retard the rate at which minority claims of
entitlement could prevail at the expense of majority interests. As is
discussed in Part III below, it turns out that even Brown v. Board of
Education,59 the case most often cited as establishing the viability of
countermajoritarian review, can be better understood as a product of
veiled majoritarianism than as a triumph of the traditional model.
Therefore, to the extent that minorities are able to forgo Supreme
Court guardianship over their interests in favor of the protections
available through the pure political process, the political option has
considerable appeal.
A.

Pure Politics

In a contest between competing societal interests that is ultimately
to be judged by political considerations, minorities might well prefer to
compete in an arena that is openly political, rather than one from
57. See J. ELY, supra note 11, at 77-88, 145-70 (describing representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) (abandoning separate-but-equal interpretation of fourteenth amendment); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II) (requiring integration of public schools
"with all deliberate speed").
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which political concerns nominally have been excluded. In an overtly
political process, minority interests will receive whatever degree of
deference their innate strength can command, subject only to limitations in the bargaining and organizational skills of minority politicians. In a positive sense, therefore, the overt political process is pure.
Outcomes are determined by counting votes, with no need to consider
the reasons for which those votes were cast. The process purports to
be nothing more than what it is - a pluralistic mechanism for generating binding results. Although rhetorical principles may accompany
the solicitation of political support, the principles themselves are inconsequential. No one cares much about their content, and their
meaning is measured only by the extent to which their rhetorical invocation proves to be effective.
For racial minorities, the overt political process has two attractions. First, the political process is definitionally immune from distortion because it has essentially no rules that can be violated. In the film
Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid,6 Butch Cassidy prevailed in a
knife fight over one of his adversaries by exploiting the absence of formal rules. Butch first suggested that he and his adversary needed to
clarify the rules of the knife fight. As the adversary - put off-guard
by Butch's suggestion - protested that there were no such things as
"rules" in a knife fight, Butch kicked the adversary very hard in a very
sensitive part of his anatomy. With this one action, Butch was able
both to establish the truth of the proposition being asserted by his adversary and to capitalize on that proposition in order to win the fight.
As a positive matter, the pure political process is nothing more
than the process of casting and counting votes. Outcomes cannot be
right or wrong, nor can they be just or unjust. They are simply the
outcomes that the process produces. Although outcomes may be determined by how the issues are framed, how support for those issues is
secured, and even by who is permitted to vote, minorities should not
be distracted by considerations relating to whether the process is operating fairly. The process simply works the way it works. What minorities should focus on is how best to maximize their influence in that
process. Minority participation in pluralist politics can, of course,
take the form of voting, running for office, or making campaign contributions, but it is not limited to those forms of involvement. Minority
participation can also take the form of demonstrations, boycotts and
riots. Although such activities may be independently illegal, for purposes of positive politics their significance is limited to their potential
60. Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (Twentieth Century-Fox 1969).
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for increasing or decreasing political strength. This is not to say that
no rules at all govern the positive political process. Operative rules
determine which strategies will increase and which will decrease political power. However, the operative rules are not only too complex and
contingent to permit them to be articulated accurately, but those rules
need never be articulated, because the selective responsiveness of the
political process itself will promote adherence to those rules without
regard to the accuracy of their formal expression. The process of positive politics - like a knife fight - cannot be distorted because it has
no formal rules. In addition, the operative rules that do govern the
process tend to be self-enforcing. 6 1
The second attraction of the overt political process is that it permits minorities to assume ultimate responsibility for their own interests. As discussed below, there are inherent limits on the political
strength of any interest group. Within those limits, however, positive
politics gives minorities themselves control over the degree to which
minority interests are advanced. Minorities determine how important
it is for minorities to engage in political activity; minorities determine
how much political activity is appropriate; and minorities decide what
minority priorities should be in selecting among competing political
objectives. Positive politics gives minorities both the credit for minority advances and the blame for minority failures. By thus promoting
minority self-determination, positive politics elevates minority dignity
and self-esteem in a way that is likely to be of more long-term significance than minority success in advancing any particular interest.
The politics inherent in the process of judicial review is of a different order. Where the overt political process is transparent and unassuming, the Supreme Court political process is opaque and
61. There are, of course, competing conceptions of the political process under which the
process is more principled than it is under my conception. Because those conceptions postulate
adherence to principle, however, they share the same weaknesses that are inherent in a principled
model of judicial review. The value of politics as I have conceptualized it here is that it escapes
the need to depend upon principle for its proper operation.
Nevertheless, I do not wish to overstate the degree to which pure politics needs to be a selfregulating endeavor. Bribery, ballot box stuffing, and vote miscounting could be considered
forms of misconduct that require external regulation - although strong positive arguments
could be made that even these abuses are subject to correction by the political process itself. Nor
do I wish to obscure the fact that differential access to the political process can drastically affect
political outcomes. Rather, the present argument is that despite these potential abuses, the political process may still be preferable to policymaking processes involving the Supreme Court.
I also realize that some advocates of political pluralism hold the political process in high
regard, according its outcomes the imprimatur of democratic legitimacy. See, eg., J. ELY, supra
note 11; cf Sunstein, Republicanism, supra note 11; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 11

(emphasizing civic republican values that can be expressed in properly operating political process). The advantages of positive politics on which I am focusing, however, do not rest upon
normative claims of external validity.
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pretentious. The Court requires its political bargaining to be conducted in the vernacular of legal principle, and its referenda to be
cloaked in the mantle of reasoned deliberation. Moreover, because judicial convention requires the justices to camouflage the political preferences that ultimately govern their applications of principle, political
negotiation with the Court is haphazard and imprecise. Judicial opinions must be deciphered for clues regarding the concessions for which
a justice will commit his or her vote. And once a commitment is
made, members of the Court are largely impervious to any leverage
through which future fidelity to that commitment could be enforced.
Unlike the positive political process that is effectively immune from
distortion, the Supreme Court process is itself a distortion that renders
the outcomes of ordinary politics uncertain. Because it is the Court
rather than the pluralist process that has the final say over which of
the competing political interests will prevail, it is the Court, rather
than the affected minority group, that retains ultimate control over the
fate of the minority group's interests.
The positive reasoning that permits one to conceive of the overt
political process as immune from the possibility of distortion also
makes it possible to characterize the Supreme Court political process
in such terms. However, this does not undermine the reasonableness
of a minority preference for a simple process that does not involve the
Supreme Court over a complex process that does. Less experienced
players can master more easily the skills required for effective participation in a simple process than acquire the skills demanded of a complex process. A preference for simplicity is particularly sensible if
complexities are differentially beneficial to participants depending on
whether they wish to maintain or to change the status quo. Supreme
Court political complexity creates just such a differential benefit,
working to the disadvantage of minorities who typically wish to alter
rather than preserve the socioeconomic status quo.
The Supreme Court adjudicatory process is political, but its political dimensions are complex and obscure. Even though every interest
group competing for Supreme Court endorsement will be burdened
similarly by the complexities of the Supreme Court process, a rational
minority response to those complexities nevertheless would be to prefer the candor and elegance of representative politics. Pluralist politics
is, of course, no panacea. Its historical loss of favor reflects genuine
grounds for concern. 62 Nevertheless, pluralist negotiation offers more
62. See, eg., Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 561 (1988)

(neutrality premises of pluralism impossible to realize); Sunstein, Interest Groups supra note 11,
at 81-85 (pluralism is normatively unattractive); Tushnet, Darknesson the Edge of Town: The
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to minorities than continued reliance on judicial review. As discussed
below, political theory suggests that minority interests can successfully
influence majoritarian politics. Moreover, minority interests have historically been better served by the representative branches than by the
Supreme Court, notwithstanding New Deal evisceration of the structural minority safeguards.
B. Minority Influence in PluralistPolitics
Majoritarian institutions can be expected to respond to minority
political preferences for at least three reasons. First, the "logrolling"
process through which majoritarian public policy is formulated gives
minorities a degree of influence over policy formulation that is commensurate with minority political strength. Second, the majority can
often best protect its own interests by protecting minority interests.
Third, minorities can negotiate political concessions from the majority
by invoking the apparent need of majoritarian institutions to conceive
of themselves as capable of countermajoritarian acts. Although innate
political strength imposes a theoretical limit on the concessions that
minorities are ultimately able to secure from the majority, minority
political skills are likely to have immediate impact on the scope of
such concessions.
Pluralist political theory predicts that in a representative democracy, majoritarian public policy will be formulated through a process
of negotiation between interest groups. The civic republican theorists
view the negotiation process as an opportunity for collective deliberation to develop virtuous civic policies that transcend the selfish desires
of the negotiating interest groups. 63 For these theorists, the interests
ContributionsofJohn Hart Ely to ConstitutionalTheory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980) (pluralism is
descriptively inaccurate); Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-

gitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331, 1378-79 (1988) (pluralist efforts
to remedy race discrimination through colorblind antidiscrimination laws ignore racism inherent
in status quo); Ehrenreich, PluralistMyths and Powerless Men.: The Ideology of Reasonableness
in Sexual HarassmentLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1190-93 (1990) (legal standard of objective reasonableness used to resolve harassment cases represents failed pluralist attempt to mediate ultimately irreconcilable conflict between divergent societal perspectives).
For general discussions of pluralist political theory, see A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GovERNMENT (1908); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); J. FREEDMAN, CRISiS AND LEGITIMACY (1978); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979); D. TRUMAN,
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1962); THE
BIAS OF PLURALISM (W. Connolly ed. 1969); Bourke, The PluralistReading of James Madison's
Tenth Federalist, 9 PERSP. AM. HIST 271 (1975); Farber & Frickey, The JurisprudenceofPublic

Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 873 (1987); Peltzman, Toward a More GeneralTheory of Regulation,
19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1975); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
63. See generally T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM (1988); Appleby,

Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 20 (1986); Horwitz, Republican-
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of racial minorities will be protected, by the prevailing moral theory to
which the deliberants collectively adhere. 64 Others, often referred to
as public choice theorists, view the political process as an inherently

self-interested one in which the most powerful special interests will
combine forces to impose their will on less powerful interest groups,
often to the detriment of the overall public welfare. 65 For this group,
the interests of racial minorities will be protected only to the extent
that racial minorities have the political power to protect themselves. 66

Even assuming that the less flattering public choice depiction is correct, and that public policy results simply from a process of logrolling
during which interest groups selfishly pursue their own interests by

trading votes, contemporary racial minorities possess sufficient political influence to participate effectively in that process. Indeed, minori-

ties may prefer the less flattering characterization, because it
minimizes the need for external regulation of the political process,

67
which could reintroduce the dangers of veiled majoritarianism.
For present purposes, it is not necessary to determine whether racial minorities have always possessed the power to protect their own

interests through participation in the pluralist political process. 68 Toism and Liberalism in American ConstitutionalThought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987);
Simon, The New Republicanism: Generosity ofSpirit in Search of Something to Say, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 83 (1987); Sunstein, Republicanism, supra note 11. See generally Symposium:
The Republican Civic Tradition, supra note 13.
64. See, eg., Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1529-32 (1988). Obvious
problems are posed if there is no common moral theory to which the deliberating interest groups
subscribe.
65. For an introduction to public choice theory, see Farber & Frickey, supra note 62, at 875906 and sources cited therein. See also K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
(2d ed. 1963); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965); R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 367-98
(1988); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, 87
PUB. INTEREST 80 (1987); Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, 14 J. ECON. LiT. 395 (1976). See
generally Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167-518 (1988).
66. See generally sources cited supra note 65.
67. Any theory which requires the majority to adhere to a substantive moral theory, or even
to a theory of elaborate procedural regularity, requires some mechanism to enforce that adherence. To the extent that the mechanism resembles judicial review, all of the problems associated
with veiled majoritarianism are posed once again.
68. Obviously, the history of de jure racial disenfranchisement in this country makes such an
argument difficult to maintain. The argument, however, is not an impossible one. Sometimes,
surrogate representation can compensate for lack of the power to vote directly. For example,
white women almost certainly had a higher standard of living than black men between enactment
of the thirteenth and the nineteenth amendments, even though black men could vote and white
women could not. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XV (ratified in 1870, giving blacks right to vote);
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIX (ratified in 1920, giving women right to vote). Moreover, white children presently have a higher standard of living than black adults, even though black adults can
vote and white children cannot. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, BLACK AND WHITE CHILDREN IN AMERICA: KEY FACTS 50 (1985) (report of Children's Defense Fund supplying data
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day, minorities plainly possess significant political power. This is
demonstrated by evidence as varied as the success of black political
candidates among white voters in the most recent elections, 69 the
strength of Jesse Jackson's showings in the two most recent presidential campaigns, 70 the adoption of minority set-aside programs such as
the one the Supreme Court invalidated in City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 7 1 and the notable presence of minority actors in television
shows and commercials. 72 Pluralist political strength stems in part
from numerical voting strength as a percentage of the total electorate.
Today, minority groups comprise a large percentage of the total elecindicating that in 1983, 30.1% of all black adults in United States lived in poverty while only
17.3% of white children under age of 18 lived in poverty). In addition, despite their disenfranchisement, blacks and women were somehow able to secure the right to vote through operation of the political process, even after the Supreme Court had failed them. See Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that blacks did not have rights of citizenship,
which was overruled by political process through Civil War and enactment of fourteenth amendment); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (upholding constitutionality of denying women right to vote, which was overruled by political process through enactment of
nineteenth amendment).
69. In the November 1989 off-year elections, several black candidates defeated white opponents by piecing together coalitions that included both black support and substantial amounts of
white support. The most notable is the election of Douglas Wilder as governor of Virginia, a
state whose population is 80% white. Wilder is the first black ever to have been elected governor
of a state since Reconstruction - although Tom Bradley lost the 1982 gubernatorial election in
California by a margin of I%, which is roughly the same margin by which Wilder won. In both
the Wilder and Bradley elections, there appears to have been a substantial "silent" racist white
vote that was not reflected in the polls. In addition, David Dinkins was elected the first black
mayor of New York City (winning 91% of the black vote, 26% of the white vote and 65% of the
ispanic vote); Norman Rice was elected the first black mayor of Seattle (a city whose population
is only 10% black); John Daniels was elected the first black mayor of New Haven; Chester
Jenkins was elected the first black mayor of Durham, North Carolina; and Michael White defeated his black opponent in the race for mayor of Cleveland by successfully competing for the
white vote. See Attinger, A Nice Guy FinishesFirstr But Dinkins May Not Be Tough Enough to
Cope with New York, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 60; Fineman, The New Black Politics Candidates
Across the Country Win Historic Victories by Emphasizing Mainstream Values, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 20, 1989, at 52; Shapiro, BreakthroughIn Virginia: In a Model of CrossoverPolitics,Douglas Wilder Becomes the FirstElected Black Governor and Shows Others How to Crash the Color
Line, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 54; Toner, Tuesday's Stakes: Black Politicians Are Leaning
Against Some Old Barriers,N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1, col. 1.
70. In 1988 Jesse Jackson received approximately 6.6 million votes in the Democratic primaries. See Dionne, Jackson Share of Votes by Whites Triples in '88, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1988, at
B7, col. 1. This represented 29% of the overall Democratic primary vote. See Kondracke, Campaign '88: Vultures THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 1988, at 10. In 1984, Jackson received approximately 3.3 million votes, comprising 18% of the Democratic primary vote. See R.
SCAMMON & A. McGILLIVRAY, AMERICA VOTES 16: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY

AMERICAN ELECTION STATISTICS 67 (1985) (supplying data on which 18% calculation is

based).
71. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); see supra text accompanying note 3.
72. The presence of minority actors in television shows and commercials attests to the presence of minority purchasing power, which can be translated into political power. The success of
the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott, orchestrated by Martin Luther King, provides an example. See Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus
Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989).
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torate. 73 By the middle of the next century, whites will constitute a
minority. 74 Accordingly, in sheer numerical terms, racial minorities

can form voting coalitions of either a temporary or a lasting nature
that have sufficient political strength to demand concessions from the

majority. 75 Of course, pluralist political power does not result solely

from innate voting strength. Minority voting strength can be supplemented by the support of majority voters who perceive a correspondence between their own interests and minority interests on particular

issues, as well as by majority voters who are simply sympathetic to
minority preferences. Such majority-minority coalitions will not be
formed if the discrete and insular nature of a minority group causes

majority members to refuse to bargain with that group. That, however, does not seem presently to be the case. The available evidence

indicates that the majority currently is bargaining with racial
76

minorities.
The welfare of minority interests is not limited solely to gains that
can be attributed to minority political power in the logrolling process.
Minority interests can also benefit incidentally from selfish actions that
the majority takes in order to advance its own interests. Slavery offers
a crass example. Assuming that slave owners have no concern for the
73. Blacks currently comprise approximately 10% of the electorate. See Shogan, Seeks to
Avoid HurtingParty: Dukakis Ponders What Role He Can Offer Jackson, L.A. Times, June 27,
1988, pt. 1, at 1, col. 1, at 14, col. 1. Hispanics comprise another 8.2%, and the Hispanic population is growing five times faster than the population at large. See Rich, Hispanic Populationof
U.S. Growing Fastest: Census Bureau Puts Total at 20.1 Million, Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 1989, at
A3, col. 5.
74. See Henry, Beyond the Melting Pot, TIME, Apr. 9, 1990, at 28, 30.
75. Creation of a lasting coalition that will, inter alia, benefit racial minorities is the strategy
embodied in Jesse Jackson's conception of the "Rainbow Coalition." The strategy appears to
have become more effective over time. In 1988, Jackson received 12% of the white vote, consisting of approximately 2.1 million votes. In 1984, Jackson received only 5% of the white vote,
consisting of approximately 650,000 votes. In addition, Jackson was able to capture 92% of the
black vote in 1988, compared to 77% in 1984. See Dionne, supra note 70. Jackson's 6.6 million
votes in 1988 are roughly comparable to the 7.0 million votes received by Edward Kennedy in
1980 and the 6.8 million votes received by Walter Mondale, who captured the Democratic nomination in 1984. See R. SCAMMON & A. McGILLIvRAY, supra note 70, at 60, 67.
76. Not only does the varied evidence discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 6875, belie the suspicion that whites will refuse to bargain with racial minorities, but the remarkable popularity of the Bill Cosby television show attests to the erosion of feelings of alienation that
might preclude such bargaining. The fact that The Cosby Show, which weekly - now daily in
some markets - depicts blacks, whites, and hispanics interacting in a relaxed and uneventful
manner, has achieved considerable popularity among white viewers, suggests the beginnings of
cultural assimilation that will increase the likelihood of future majority-minority coalitions. As
the degree of assimilation grows, race will ultimately come to lose its status as a characteristic
around which interest group identities will be formed. The prospective barriers to pluralist bargaining are likely to be more economic than racial - the Cosby characters are firmly uppermiddle class. Although there may be many sound reasons for which one would object to the loss
of distinctive cultural identity attendant to assimilation into the dominant culture, in terms of the
single goal of advancing pluralist political power, assimilation seems likely to be beneficial.
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welfare of minority human beings, productivity concerns will nevertheless cause slave owners to make food, clothing and shelter concessions to their minority slaves. Although one could argue that these
productivity concerns in fact give slaves the political power to demand
concessions, that characterization seems unrealistic. The cost to slaves
of exercising whatever bargaining leverage they may theoretically be
said to possess is simply prohibitive. It is more meaningful to conceive
of such concessions as incidents of majority efforts to advance their
own interests, which occur independently of the exercise of minority
political power. This suggests that minorities can maximize their welfare by allocating the political capital that they do possess to interests
not subject to such derivative advancement. In addition, to the extent
that minority politicians are skillful in framing the presentation of
political issues, they can define issues relevant to minority interests in
ways that make them appear to be issues that advance majority preferences. The abortion controversy may provide a contemporary example. If one assumes that liberal access to abortion services will
advance minority interests - something that is, of course, open to
debate - it might make sense for minority politicians to allocate their
political resources to different issues, believing that politically powerful white middle class women will ensure such liberal access for themselves and incidentally for minority women. This is a useful example,
because it also illustrates the potential danger of pursuing such an allocation strategy. The political preferences of white, middle-class women may ultimately prevail on the abortion issue, but their victory
also may be obtained by deflecting anti-abortion opposition away from
themselves and toward minority abortions. Arguably, that is precisely
what happened after Roe v. Wade,77 when liberal access to abortion
services was available but abortion funding was not.78 Accordingly,
although minority political strength can be enhanced by free-riding on
majority preferences, the: strategy can be a risky one.
In addition to its inherent voting strength, supplemented by participation in voting coalitions, effective minority political power can also
be enhanced by playing upon the majority's own need to believe itself
capable of countermajoritarian sensitivities. The countermajoritarian
model of judicial review was not preordained. Rather, it was a liberal
political invention designed to counteract majoritarian threats to indi77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding constitutional right to abortion). But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (arguably limiting scope of constitutional right to

abortion).
78. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of federal refusal
to fund abortions), Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding constitutionality of state re-

fusal to fund abortions).
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vidual liberty that the majority itself perceived to be quite real. 79 Paradoxically, continued faith in the viability of this invention is essential
to continued majority acquiescence in majoritarian authority. 80 This
means that the Supreme Court must exhibit sufficient deference to minority interests during the process of judicial review to reassure the
majority of the Court's countermajoritarian capabilities. In addition
to the victories that minorities secure through the overt political process, therefore, minorities can also win some political victories before
the Supreme Court, which by hypothesis they could not win before the
political branches. As discussed below, 81 effective use of the Supreme
Court as a political institution can be both difficult and risky enough
that, if given the option, minorities could sensibly choose to avoid the
Court. To the extent that the option of avoidance is unavailable, however, skillful use of the Court can provide yet another method for increasing the amount of operative political power that minorities
possess.
In theory, the magnitude of minority political influence is limited
by inherent minority political strength. Those limits, however, are of
more theoretical than practical interest because they will never be
reached. Variations in operative minority political power are so likely
to result from the manner in which minorities make their political
judgments and exercise their political skills that the innate limitations
become relatively insignificant. Questions concerning when to form
coalitions, when to free-ride on majoritarian preferences, how to frame
political issues, and when to involve the Supreme Court, are so complex that there will always be opportunities for minorities to increase
their political strength by increasing their political skills.
C. Minority Frustrationsin the Supreme Court
The influence that pluralist theory predicts minorities will have in
the majoritarian political process has been borne out empirically. Minorities have not only secured significant concessions from the representative branches, but the representative branches have typically
done more than the Supreme Court to advance minority interests. In
fact, the Supreme Court's civil rights performance has historically
been so disappointing that it lends little, if any, support to the tradi79. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.

80. If the majority voted to deprive itself of majoritarian governing authority in order to
safeguard individual liberties, governmental compliance with such a vote would itself be an exercise of majoritarian authority that would remain operative only so long as it continued to command majority support.
81. See infra Parts III & IV.
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tional model of judicial review. Rather, the Court's decisions serve
more as a refutation than a validation of countermajoritarian judicial

capacity.
Minority interests in the United States have typically been advanced through the political process. The most obvious example is the
manumission of black slaves. Slavery itself was A political creation
that the majoritarian Framers chose to accord some degree of constitutional protection. 82 At the time the Constitution was ratified, slavery was a very contentious issue that the Framers anticipated would
continue to be the focus of future political attention. 83 That attention
gradually resulted in total emancipation. First, some northern states

enacted legislation that abolished slavery within their jurisdictions."
82. The Constitution contains three provisions that are directly addressed to slavery. Article
I, § 9, prohibits Congress from terminating the importation of new slaves until 1808, and authorizes the imposition of a federal tax on imported slaves. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Article I,
§ 2, apportions legislative representation in the House of Representatives on the basis of state
population, counting each slave as three-fifths of a person for apportionment purposes. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (1788, amended 1868). Article IV, § 2, prohibits one state from according free status to a slave who has escaped to that state from another state. U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2, cl. 3 (1788, superseded 1865). See G. STONE, supra note 11, at 436.
83. See, eg., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting congressional termination of slave trade
until 1808); see G. STONE, supra note 11, at 436-37.
84. See generally R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PRO-

CESS (1975); SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 1700-1872, SER. No. 7,
STATUTES ON SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LrrERATURE (P. Finkeiman, ed. 1988); A. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE
COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); M. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981); W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTiSLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977).

The precise manner in which slavery was ended varied from state to state. For example,
there is debate as to precisely when slavery came to an end in Massachusetts. The state constitution, ratified in 1780, contained a clause stating, "All men are born free and equal, and have
certain natural and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberty .... " In 1783, the Supreme Judicial Court convicted a white
defendant of beating and imprisoning a black man, despite the defense that the black man was
the defendant's slave. In 1781, the court reached a similar result in the case of another alleged
slave. In combination, these cases helped to promote prevailing public opinion that blacks
should be deemed free, thereby effectively ending slavery in Massachusetts. See R. COVER,
supra, at 43-50. The Massachusetts experience also dictated the status of slavery in the territory
of Maine, which did not separate from its mother state of Massachusetts until 1820. See Wiecek,
supra, at 51.
In Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38 (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the
Connecticut Constitution, which also contained a "free and equal" provision, did not prohibit
slavery. Rather, the court deferred to state emancipation statutes that freed slaves gradually. A
1774 statute prohibited the importation of slaves into Connecticut. A 1784 statute stated that no
person of color born after that year could be forced to remain a slave after he or she reached the
age of 25. See 12 Conn. at 38-44; R. COVER, supra, at 55 n.*. Similarly, in the 1845 case of State
v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368 (N.J. 1845), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the "free and equal"
clause in its constitution did not apply to slaves. 20 N.J.L. at 382-83. Therefore, the estimated
700 slaves remaining in New Jersey more than 40 years following the passage of a gradual emancipation statute in 1804 had to wait for their freedom under the Act. See I COVER, supra, at 55-

60.
The Pennsylvania Act of 1780 stated that all persons born after July 4, 1780, were to be free.
Slaves born before that date would remain slaves during their lifetimes. Children of these slaves-
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Then, Congress enacted federal legislation prohibiting slavery in the
new territory acquired through the Louisiana Purchase. 85 Next, in
1861, after the outbreak of the Civil War, President Lincoln issued the

Emancipation Proclamation, which abolished slavery in the southern

states. 86 Finally, in 1865, after the end of the Civil War, Congress

adopted and the states ratified the thirteenth amendment, abolishing
slavery throughout the United States. 87 Manumission illustrates that
even the interests of completely disenfranchised minorities will be advanced through the political process when they correspond to the perfor-life would remain slaves for 28 years. See id. at 62-63. The Vermont Constitution contained
a "free and equal" provision that was implemented through a specific prohibition on keeping a
person a "servant, slave or apprentice" after age 21 for males and age 18 for females. Id. at 275
n.5. The Vermont Supreme Court held that this clause ended slavery in the case of Selectmen of
Windsor v. Jacob, 2 Tyl. 192 (Vt. 1802). New York passed a gradual emancipation statute in
1799. Children freed by this act remained slaves until age 28 for males and 25 for females. See
W. WIEcEK, supra, at 89.

Rhode Island passed a gradual emancipation statute freeing all children born after March 1,
1784. The statute declared that "all men are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
and the holding mankind in a state of slavery, as private property . . . is repugnant to this
principle." 1784 R.I. Publ. Laws, quoted in W. WIECEK, supra, at 50. In 1843, Rhode Island
adopted a constitution that removed any remaining traces of slavery in the state. See W.
WIECEK, supra,at 50. Delaware, which was a slave state, had a clause in its constitution forbidding the importation of slaves. See id. at 48. In New Hampshire, slavery appears simply to have
faded away without any specific legal cause. See id at 51.
85. Missouri Compromise, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545, 548 (1820). An amendment to the Act, which
enabled Missouri to enter the Union without restrictions on slavery, was authored by Senator
Jesse B. Thomas of Illinois. The Thomas Amendment was the key provision in what became
known as the Missouri Compromise. The amendment stated that slavery was "forever prohibited" in the remaining portion of the Louisiana Territory, which was the area north of 36 degrees, 30 minutes latitude. There was little debate in either House of Congress over the Thomas
amendment. President Monroe signed the Act, interpreting "forever prohibited" to mean for the
duration of the territorial period. It was assumed that the Compromise could be extended to any
additional territories that the United States would acquire. See D. FEHRENBACHER, THE Dred
Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics 107-13 (1978).
By 1850, with California seeking to join the Union, it became apparent that a new compromise was needed if secession by the southern states was to be avoided. Henry Clay's suggested
solution to the slavery problem became the basis for the Compromise of 1850. Under this agreement, California was admitted to the Union as a free state, while the Utah and New Mexico
Territories were organized without restrictions on slavery. In addition, the slave trade was prohibited in the District of Columbia. The Compromise of 1850 did not repeal the Thomas amendment because Congress perceived it as unrelated to that amendment. See Id. at 157-63.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act, which followed in 1854, did repeal the Thomas amendment as it
applied to the Kansas and Nebraska Territories. See id. at 108. The Act, organizing the Nebraska Territory from 36 degrees, 30 minutes to the Canadian border, was a noninterventionist
compromise "not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but
to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their
own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 184; see id. at 178-87.
Finally, in 1857, the greatly weakened Thomas amendment was invalidated by the Supreme
Court on constitutional grounds in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating Missouri Compromise prohibition on slavery).
86. The Emancipation Proclamation stated: "[A]Il persons held as slaves within any State or
designated part of a State, the people whereof [are] in rebellion against the United States, [are
h]ence-forward, and forever free...." See J. FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
96 (1963).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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ceived interests of the majority.88
Manumission also illustrates that the political process can be much
more advantageous to racial minorities than the judicial process.
When the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to limit slavery
six years before the Emancipation Proclamation in the infamous Dred
Scott case,89 it declined to do so, issuing an opinion so demeaning to
blacks that it reads like a parody of Supreme Court insensitivity to
minority interests. In rejecting the claim of free status asserted by a

slave who had been taken by his owner to a free state, then to the
Louisiana Territory where slavery had been prohibited, and then
brought back to the owner's original slave state, Chief Justice Taney's
opinion made two assertions that are remarkable coming from a purportedly countermajoritarian institution. First, the opinion asserted

that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the suit because the subhuman
character of the black plaintiff deprived him of the capacity for citizen-

ship required to invoke the Court's diversity jurisdiction. 90 Second,
even though the Court lacked jurisdiction, the opinion declared that
88. Formation of a majoritarian abolitionist coalition is attributable to four types of objections to slavery: religious and moral objections; philosophical objections; political objections;
and economic objections.
The strongest objections on religious and moral grounds came from the Puritans and the
Quakers. Similar concerns were also raised by Congregationalists, Methodists, Baptists, and
Presbyterians. Philosophically, slavery as an institution ran counter to the idea of individual
liberty upon which many individuals thought the country was founded. Slavery raised political
concerns that denying liberty to some would weaken the nation as a whole. In addition, many
feared retribution from slaves and wanted to diffuse what they considered to be a political time
bomb.
Although no significant organized movement fought against slavery based upon economic
grounds, many considered slave labor unprofitable. The cost of slave importation was high,
slaves were often seen as an untrustworthy labor force, and it was costly to protect whites from
the "undesirable" slave element of the population. Finally, many believed the existence of slavery discouraged white labor. See M. LOCKE, ANTI-SLAVERY IN AMERICA: FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF AFRICAN SLAVES TO THE PROHIBITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE (1619-1808) 1-11

(1965).

See generally W. GOODELL, SLAVERY AND ANTI-SLAVERY:

A HISTORY OF THE

GREAT STRUGGLE IN BOTH HEMISPHERES: WITH A VIEW OF THE SLAVERY QUESTION IN THE
UNITED STATES (Negro Universities Press reprint 1968) (1852); A. ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST
EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH (1967).

89. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
90. The opinion states:
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous terms, and
mean the same thing.... The question before us is, whether [blacks are] a portion of this
people .... We think they are not and that they are not included, and were not intended to
be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of
the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the
United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and
inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but
such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time
of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was
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the provision of the Missouri Compromise statute prohibiting slavery
in the Louisiana Territory was unconstitutional because it deprived
slave owners of a property interest in their slaves. 9 1 The first assertion

is remarkable because it evidences an unmistakably strong attitudinal
predisposition that would seem to be disqualifying for an institution
charged with safeguarding minority interests. Considering the range
of political positions concerning slavery that existed at the time, the
subhuman position adopted by the Court seems to have been the most
disadvantageous to blacks. 92 The second assertion is remarkable be-

cause it reveals that this subhuman-property predisposition of the
Court was so strong that the Court felt itself obligated to invalidate a
majoritarianenactment limiting the spread of slavery. It is even more

remarkable because the Court relied upon the need to defer to
majoritarian policymakers as a justification for its jurisdictional hold-

ing. 93 Indeed, most of the judicial encounters with slavery that ocframed and adopted. But the public history of every European nation displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations;
and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and
that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05, 407.
91. The opinion states:
[The] right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.
The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of the United States, in every State that might desire it, for twenty years.
And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, if the slave
escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words - too plain to be misunderstood. And
no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave
property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any
other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding
and protecting the owner in his rights.
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451-52.
92. Although Chief Justice Taney purported to be reporting the views of the Framers rather
than his own views concerning the status of blacks, see 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05,407, the tone
of Taney's opinion belies any suggestion that Taney himself did not share those views. See supra
notes 90-91. Although slavery has existed in numerous societies and cultures, the brand of slavery that existed in the American South developed to the highest degree a slaveholder ideology
under which the honor of the slaveholder was directly dependent upon the degradation of the
slave. See 0. PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 94-97 (1982).
93. In justifying its conclusion that the subhuman character of blacks made them incapable
in the eyes of the Framers of acquiring the citizenship necessary to give the Court jurisdiction,
the opinion states: "It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the
policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or lawmaking power ....
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405. It is more than a little ironic that the Court
found itself to lack jurisdiction to entertain suits filed by those whose interests it was required to
protect under the traditional model.
Although one might argue that Chief Justice Taney was deferring to the majoritarian Framers rather than to the majoritarian Congress that enacted the Missouri Compromise, arguments
of this type pose insoluble analytical difficulties. Where the Framers did not specifically provide
otherwise, see supra note 82, they likely desired congressional preferences to govern resolution of
future issues that would arise concerning slavery. See G. STONE, supra note 11, at 436-37. The
Framers, however, may have specifically "provided otherwise" by including in the Constitution
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curred prior to the Civil War resulted in judicial invalidation of
majoritarian efforts to limit slavery. 94 Dred Scott was the second
Supreme Court decision to invalidate a congressional enactment on
constitutional grounds; Marbury itself was the first. Dred Scott, therefore, can be seen as continuing the Supreme Court tradition established in Marbury of sacrificing the interests of those that the Court is
charged with protecting in order to advance ulterior political
95
objectives.
The major advances that racial minorities have made since manumission have also come from the representative branches. The four-

teenth amendment overruled Dred Scott by granting citizenship to
blacks, and it provided constitutional validation for the Reconstruc-

tion civil rights statutes now codified in sections 1981, 1982, and 1983
of title 42 of the United States Code. 96 After a post-Reconstruction

lapse in congressional responsiveness to minority interests, congressional civil rights activity increased in the mid-twentieth century. The
Civil Rights Acts of 195797 and 196098 created federal remedies for

voting discrimination. The omnibus Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited various types of public and private discrimination. Among its

most significant provisions are Title II, which prohibits discrimination

in public accommodations, 99 Title IV, which authorizes the Attorney
General to maintain school desegregation suits, 100 Title VI, which prohibits segregation in schools receiving federal funds, 10 1 and Title VII,
the protections for private property on which Chief Justice Taney relied to invalidate the Missouri Compromise prohibition on slavery. See supra note 91. It is precisely this sort of analytical
difficulty that Part I of the present article argues can be resolved only through recourse to the
personal preferences of individual judges.
It also is possible to argue that the Dred Scott Court was engaged in an act of
countermajoritarianism precisely because it did invalidate the majoritarian Missouri Compromise, in order to prevent the majoritarian abrogation of individual property rights. This argument, however, is suspect because the Missouri Compromise appears to have been politically
dead at the time of its judicial invalidation, thereby making the Court's decision more
majoritarian than countermajoritarian. See supra note 85.
94. G. STONE, supra note I1, at 440.
95. See supra note 18.
96. See G. STONE, supra note 11, at 444-51.
97. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982)).
98. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86, 90 (1960) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982)).
99. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat 241, 243 (1964) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (1982)).
100. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 248 (1964) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000c-6 (1982)).
101. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. h. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 240 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d to 2000d-1 (1982)).
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which prohibits discrimination in employment.1 0 2 The Voting Rights
Acts of 1965,103 1970104 and 1975105 substantially enhanced the federal safeguards against voting discrimination contained in the 1957
and 1960 Acts by suspending literacy tests for voter registration and
by requiring attorney general preclearance of apportionment changes
that might be used to dilute minority voting strength. 10 6 The Fair
Housing Act of 1968107 contains provisions that prohibit discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, and it imposes increased federal
criminal sanctions for the violation of individual civil rights. 10 8 The
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 contained minority set-aside
provisions requiring that ten percent of the funds given to state and
local governments for construction purposes had to be used to secure
10 9
goods or services supplied by minority-owned enterprises.
In addition to congressional enactments, the executive branch has
also advanced minority interests. For example, the president by executive order has imposed affirmative action obligations on federal contractors. 110 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
developed the school desegregation guidelines used to implement the
Title VI fund cut-off provisions under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.1 1 ' In
addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has developed guidelines to implement the Title VII employment discrimination provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,1 12 and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development has developed guidelines to implement the fair housing provisions of the 1968 Civil Rights Act.' 13 Ob102. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
103. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)).
104. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-1, 1973aa-2 to 1973aa-4, 1973bb (1982)).
105. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973d, 1973h, 1973i, 19731, 1973aa, 1973aa-la to 1973aa-4, 1973bb (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)).
106. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 859, 929-30; G. STONE, supra note 11, at 580-81.
107. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 81 (1968) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
108. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 916-17.
109. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (1982)).
110. See, eg., Executive Order No. 11,246, Part II, Subpart B, 3 C.F.R 339, 340-42 (196465).
111. See G. STONE, supra note 11, at 474.
112. See 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1989) (affirmative action appropriate under Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended); 29 C.F.R. § 1690 (1989) (procedures on interagency coordination of equal employment opportunity issuances).
113. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 106, 109-20 (1990) (fair housing administrative meetings under Title
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1968).
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viously, the representative branches have not been uniformly or
consistently deferential to minority interests. Rather, they have made
concessions to minority interests when the overall political climate has
been conducive to such concessions.
The Supreme Court has greeted majoritarian efforts to advance minority interests with a mixed response. On occasion those efforts have
been validated, as when the Court upheld the federal minority setaside program established by the 1977 Public Works Employment Act
in Fullilove v. Klutznick 114 Sometimes the Court has shown even
more sensitivity to minority interests than the representative branch
whose action the Court validated. For example, in holding that the
Reconstruction statutes reached private as well as official government
conduct, the Court may well have gone beyond the actual intent of the
Reconstruction Congress in its solicitude for minority interests.1 1 5 On
other occasions, majoritarian efforts to advance minority interests
11 6
have met with marked judicial hostility, as they did in Dred Scott.
For example, although the Court upheld the federal minority set-aside
program in Fullilove, recently it invalidated a similar municipal program in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 117 And although it recently reaffirmed the applicability of the Reconstruction statutes to
private action, it simultaneously redefined the substantive scope of
prohibited discrimination in a way that excluded much discrimination
that did not constitute state action."" Like the representative
branches, the Supreme Court has not been uniform or consistent in its
deference to minority interests. Rather, the Court, too, has made concessions to minority interests when the overall political climate has
been conducive to such concessions.
I have argued that a rational minority response to the veiled
majoritarian nature of the Supreme Court would be to abandon efforts
to influence the Court and to concentrate minority political activities
on the representative branches, because minorities are more likely to
114. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
115. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); cf The Civil Rights

Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 89-95.

117. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 3.
118. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), the Court held that
although the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibition on discrimination in the formation and enforcement of
contracts applied to private acts of discrimination, it did not cover discriminatory performance of
a contract through racial harassment of an employee. Discriminatory enforcement occurred
only if the state made enforcement remedies for breach of contract selectively available on the
basis of race. 109 S. Ct. at 2372-77. The net effect of this holding was to reimpose a state action

requirement in § 1981 suits with respect to discriminatory contract performance.
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secure concessions from an overtly political branch of government
than from a branch whose political dimensions are covert. I have also
argued that comparison of the historical performances of the representative branches and the Supreme Court provides empirical support for
this theory, because the representative branches have done more than
the Court to advance minority interests. One might object to this asserted preference for the representative branches by arguing that if the
actions of each branch are ultimately determined by majoritarian
political preferences, it should not matter which branch minorities
choose as the focus of their political efforts. The response to this objection is that, although the Supreme Court is a majoritarian branch of
government, the Court responds to different types of political preferences than the preferences to which the representative branches
respond.

III. A POLITICAL

MODEL OF THE SUPREME COURT

However strong a rational minority preference for representative
over Supreme Court politics might be, minorities do not have the practical option of forgoing Supreme Court adjudication completely. Minorities acting unilaterally cannot terminate the force of judicial
review because nonminorities have the power to present the Court
with political issues that minorities would prefer to have resolved by
the representative branches alone. Moreover, minorities themselves
will require judicial assistance in implementing the gains made
through the political process. This means that minorities have no
choice but to develop a model of Supreme Court politics that will enable them to make optimal use of the Supreme Court's political
sensitivities.
The institutional characteristics of the Court suggest that it will be
receptive to two types of political preferences. It will be receptive to
durable preferences that command sustained majoritarian support,
and to broad-based transitory preferences that command intense levels
of majoritarian support. Brown v. Board of Education,1 1 9 the case typically offered as establishing the viability of the traditional model, is
better understood as an illustration of the Supreme Court's selective
political sensitivity. Although proficient use of the Court as a political
institution can advance minority interests, the complexities entailed in
such political use of the Court make Supreme Court political strategies
both difficult and risky.
119. See supra note 59.
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The Complexities of Supreme Court Politics

Although representative politics is more promising than Supreme
Court politics for minority interests, minorities do not have the luxury
of concentrating their efforts exclusively on the representative
branches. When minorities secure political concessions from the
majoritarian branches, nonminority interest groups disadvantaged by
those concessions can force minorities to defend their political victories before the Supreme Court. Many of the affirmative action gains
that minorities have made through the political process have been subject to just such nonminority challenges. 120 In addition, minorities
will often be compelled to seek judicial enforcement of the political
gains secured from the representative branches. The assistance of the
Court will be required both to resolve ambiguities in majoritarian enactments and to prompt compliance by recalcitrant nonminority inter-

ests.121 Because minorities will be forced to engage in Supreme Court

litigation on at least some occasions, minorities might well wish to
develop a working model of the political claims to which the Court
will be receptive, and the claims that it is likely to reject.
Part I of this article suggested that life tenure and salary protection
are unable to provide any meaningful safeguard against the influence
that a judge's own socialized majoritarian preferences will have on the

adjudicatory process. 122 That does not, however, mean that life tenure
and salary protection are irrelevant to judicial outcomes. Rather, they
give the Court an institutional sensitivity to particular types of political arguments. To the extent that life tenure and salary protection
120. See, eg., Martin v. Wilkes, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (constitutional challenge by nonminority firefighters to Title VII consent decree giving minority firefighters preference over nonminority firefighters for certain promotions); City of Richmond v. l.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706
(1989) (constitutional challenge by nonminority contractors to minority set-aside program giving
minority-owned business enterprises preference over nonminority businesses in receiving certain
construction funds); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (constitutional challenge by nonminority teachers to collective bargaining agreement giving minority school teachers
layoff preference over nonminority teachers with greater seniority); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (constitutional challenge by nonminority applicant to medical
school admissions program giving preference to minority applicants over nonminority applicants
for certain seats).
121. See, eg., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (minority employee
sought aid of Court in using 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibition on discrimination in contract formation and enforcement to prevent racial harassment by employer); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (class of minority employees sought aid of Court in establishing
that statistical disparities in employer use of subjective employment and promotion criteria were
sufficient to prove Title VII violation); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984) (minority class action seeking aid of Court in imposing race-conscious class-based remedy
under Title VII for discriminatory hiring by municipal fire department); Guardians Assn. v. Civil
Serv. Commn., 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (class action filed by minority police officers seeking aid of
Court in enforcing antidiscrimination provisions of Titles VI & VII).
122. See supra section I.B.
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cause Supreme Court justices to remain on the bench for extended
periods of time, at any particular moment the Court will include a
significant number of justices whose political socialization occurred

many years earlier.12 3 Institutionally, a Supreme Court staffed by
such individuals is likely to be receptive to two distinct types of polit-

ical arguments.
Professor Tushnet has identified the first type of argument. 124 The
Court will respond to arguments advancing political preferences that

are durable rather than transitory. The amount of political power that
a pluralist voting coalition possesses is a direct function of its longev-

ity. A coalition that can secure majoritarian support for its position
on a single issue will be able to prevail upon that issue, but it will not
be able to implement a political agenda that encompasses multiple issues or even repeated tests of a single issue. In order to advance a
political agenda, a coalition must command sustained political support. A coalition that can sustain majority support for a two-year period can control the House of Representatives, all of whose members
are elected every two years. 125 Such a coalition, therefore, will be able
to prevail in those contests where the position of the House is dispositive. 126 A coalition that can sustain majority support for a period of
123. The average age of a Supreme Court justice when appointed is 53 (55 for justices appointed in this century), and the average length of a justice's stay on the Court is 16 years. See
W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER, & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. A (6th
ed. 1986) [hereinafter W. LOCKHART] (providing data on which statistics are based).
By the term "political socialization," I mean to include the process of forming values and
affiliations that occurs during the critical periods of one's personal political development. I am
postulating the existence of such critical periods, although I am unsure precisely when they occur. Intuitively, critical periods could include the time at which one first becomes aware of the
political preferences of one's parents - although the response to this awareness might be either
to accept or to reject those preferences precisely because they are parental preferences. The
period of adolescent idealism might also constitute a political critical period, as might the period
in which that idealism is subsequently lost or supplanted by the pragmatism that can accompany
marriage, parenthood, and financial obligations. For present purposes, all that matters is that
these periods occur relatively early in one's adult life - something that intuitively seems to be
correct. Although mid- and late-career changes in basic political values do occur, they occur
infrequently. Mid- and late-career changes are more likely to concern particular issues than
basic political orientation. The effects of the political socialization process can be tested by the
political commitments, both tacit and express, that a potential justice is willing to make in order
to secure appointment to the Supreme Court. Although these commitments are largely unenforceable, their extraction nevertheless filters out candidates who are unwilling to make the requested commitments.
124. Tushnet, The Politics of ConstitutionalLaw, in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed.)
(2d ed. forthcoming).
125. In order to control the vote of a representative, a coalition must have the popular votes
needed to secure initial election and, in addition, must for two years be able to maintain a credible threat that failure to comply with the wishes of the coalition will result in the failure of the
representative to secure reelection.
126. The position of the House of Representatives alone will be dispositive with respect to
issues such as impeachment, which the Constitution assigns exclusively to the House, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. It can also be dispositive with respect to issues over which the distribu-
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four years is in a much stronger position to advance its agenda. It not
only controls the House of Representatives for two terms, but it also
controls the president, who is elected to a four-year term. In addition,
because one third of the Senate is elected every two years, a four-year
coalition can also control the Senate, by controlling the votes of two
thirds of its members. A coalition durable enough to last four years,
therefore, can control the entire federal government - except for the
judiciary. Because of their longer "terms of office," Supreme Court
justices can only be controlled by political coalitions having substantial durability. Professor Tushnet postulates that a coalition must
command majority support for approximately a decade before it can
control the judiciary, which would then give it control over the entire
federal government. 127 Hence, regardless of the particular political
preferences that individual justices may have, the Supreme Court as an
institution will be receptive to legal arguments advancing political positions that have the support of durable rather than transitory majorities. The ultimate effect of this selective sensitivity is to render the
Court a force for preservation of the political status quo. Proponents
of political change will be less successful before the Court than will
128
their opponents.
The second type of argument to which the Supreme Court will
respond favorably is an argument that advances an issue whose political support, while transitory, is both broad-based and intense. This is
due, in part, to the ability that proponents of such issues have to raise
a credible threat of removal. Because Supreme Court justices have life
tenure, political control over individual justices must normally be exercised at the selection stage. Under ordinary circumstances, politically motivated threats of retaliatory removal are unlikely to have
much credibility in light of the political difficulty of securing impeachment. Tushnet's theory would predict that a political coalition having
a four-year durability would be required to impeach and convict a justice.1 29 In light of the reluctance of interest groups to use impeachtion of political power and the political climate give practical control to the House. Such issues
will arise frequently when the House is controlled by a different political party than the party
controlling the Senate and the White House.

127. See Tushnet, supra note 124. Tushnet does not offer a prediction for how much time it
would take to control the Supreme Court alone, although the 10-year estimate seems reasonable
for the Supreme Court too. Historically, the average tenure of a justice on the Supreme Court
has been approximately 16 years. See W. LOCKHART, supra note 123, app. A (providing data on
which statistic is based). If each justice serves for 16 years, on average, one of the nine justices
will leave the Court every 1.75 years. This means that it will take approximately 9 years for a

five-justice majority of the Court to turn over.
128. See Tushnet, supra note 124.
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 & § 3, cl. 6 (requiring majority of House to impeach
and two thirds of Senate to convict).
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ment for ordinary political purposes, such a coalition would normally

be quite difficult to amass. In a climate of intense political fervor,
however, the threat of impeachment might be more credible. Both
individuals and electorates are capable of taking acts in the heat of the
moment that they would not take after calmer reflection.1 30 More
subtly, to the extent that the justices view intense popular resistance as

a threat to the perceptions of legitimacy that the Court needs to issue
unpopular decisions, the justices will respond favorably to expressions
of popular disapproval that are intense enough to jeopardize the

Court's continued legitimacy but not intense enough to pose a credible
threat of impeachment. Cases like Korematsu v. United States,13 1 in
which the Court upheld the World War II geographic exclusion of

Japanese-Americans from certain locations on the West Coast, illustrate such Supreme Court submission to an intense political preference. It is difficult to understand the case as anything other than
judicial deference to popular desires for punishment of the Japanese
after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. 132

B. Brown and the PoliticalModel
Brown v. Board of Education133 is the case typically offered in sup-

port of the countermajoritarian capacity of the Supreme Court. The
desegregation of southern schools that the Brown Court ordered in

1954 provoked predictable massive resistance. According to the tradi130. In the history of the nation, only one Supreme Court justice has been impeached. Samuel Chase, who was one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, was appointed to
the Court by George Washington in 1796. He was impeached in 1804 for charging Thomas
Jefferson with "seditious attacks on the principle of the Constitution." He was acquitted by the
Senate on March 1, 1805, by only four votes. He then continued to serve on the Court until
1811. See A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL
STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 33 n.1 (1978); W. LOCKHART,

supra note 123, app. A, at 5. In modem times, both Chief Justice Earl Warren, see B.
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 280-82 (1983), and Associate Justice William 0. Douglas, see W.
DOUGLAS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS: THE COURT YEARS: 1939-75,
359-64, 371-77 (1980), have been the targets of unsuccessful impeachment campaigns.
The fact that only one Supreme Court justice has been impeached and that no justice has
been convicted can be used either to support or to refute the argument that the threat of impeachment can affect judicial behavior. The apparent difficulty of securing the political support
necessary to impeach and convict may give the threat of impeachment little credibility, and concomitantly, little capacity to affect judicial behavior. On the other hand, the threat of impeachment might temper judicial views and prompt judicial responsiveness to majoritarian norms so
that the political need for impeachment rarely arises.
131. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
132. The decision was a product of wartime hysteria and racial resentment, and it has been
widely criticized. See, e.g., R. DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS: NORTH AMERICA, JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA DURING WORLD WAR 11130-43 (rev. ed. 1981); J.
TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 211-23
(1954).
133. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 1I); 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
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tional wisdom, the fact that the Supreme Court was willing to disregard such high levels of majoritarian disapproval in issuing its school
desegregation order reveals that the Court must possess countermajoritarian capabilities. This conclusion is further buttressed by the
post-Brown decisions in which the Court stuck to its convictions and
ordered the lower courts to fashion novel equitable remedies such as
busing to implement the Brown decision, again in the face of massive
resistance. Notwithstanding this traditional view, Brown actually is
better understood as an illustration of the selective political responsiveness of the veiled majoritarian Court.
The Brown decision is commonly viewed as having accomplished
two things. As a practical matter, it required the desegregation of
public schools. 134 As a doctrinal matter, it overruled the separate-butequal principle of Plessy v. Ferguson,135 and established the proposition
that race-based classifications are inherently unequal because they inevitably operate to disadvantage the minority race. 13 6 As an actual
matter, Brown may not have realized these accomplishments at all.
Moreover, to the extent that these accomplishments were actually secured by the Brown decision, they appear to have corresponded to the
political preferences of the durable majority whose interests were represented on the Brown Supreme Court. In addition, the Court's advancement of those majoritarian preferences may well have been
secured at the expense of long-term minority interests, thereby illustrating the difficulties attendant to political use of the Supreme Court.
The fact that Brown is perceived to stand for the two propositions
with which it is associated attests to the rhetorical success of the case.
When needed, Brown is now available for citation in briefs and judicial
opinions to support either the limited proposition that the Constitu134. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), declared the maintenance of separate-but-equal public schools to be unconstitutional. Brown 11 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), issued after reargument
addressing the issue of remedy, ordered segregated public schools to be desegregated "with all
deliberate speed."
135. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Brown 1 347 U.S. at 495. Although Plessy upheld the constitutionality of racially separate public facilities, the case did not by its terms require that those
facilities be equal. Nevertheless, subsequent cases did require varying degrees of equality, and
Plessy is the case that is typically cited for the separate-but-equal requirement. See G. STONE,
supra note 11, at 454-56.
136. Brown I held that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," 347 U.S. at
495, because "[t]o separate [school children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 347 U.S. at 494. As a
result, race-based classifications could be sustained only if they satisfied the most exacting scrutiny. 347 U.S. at 499 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)) ("[A]ll
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.
That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
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tion requires public schools to be desegregated or the broader proposition that race-based classifications in general are unconstitutional. As
an actual matter, Brown of course did not desegregate the schools. A

third of the black students attending public school in the United States
still attend all-black schools, and sixty-three percent attend schools
that are at least half black. Private schools, gerrymandered district

lines, unequal funding, white flight, residential housing patterns, and
resegregation are among the many factors that prevented the rhetorical promise of Brown from ever becoming a reality. 137 As an actual
matter, Brown also did not terminate governmental use of race-based

classifications. Although subsequent cases issued shortly after Brown
relied upon the Brown decision to invalidate racial segregation in public facilities such as buses, beaches, and golf courses, 138 the Court did
not rely upon Brown to invalidate all racial classifications. Most nota-

bly, the Court declined to invalidate miscegenation statutes, straining
39
to avoid any application of Brown that would produce this result.
Realistically, Brown had enormous rhetorical success and only partial
practical success.
The combination of substantial rhetorical success and limited practical success that I have attributed to Brown appears to have been pre-

cisely what the Court's durable majoritarian constituency desired.
The massive resistance that accompanied Brown does not mean that
the decision lacked majoritarian support. Indeed, the resistance was

regional rather than national in scope. At the level of national politics
137. See G. STONE, supra note 11, at 488-95. See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW §§ 7.4-7.8 (2d ed. 1980).
138. See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S.
879 (1955) (public golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public
beaches).
139. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), on remand, 197 Va. 734, 90
S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam). After issuing its 1954 decision in
Brown , 347 U.S. 483 (1954), invalidating separate-but-equal treatment based upon race, the
Court nevertheless declined to invalidate a Virginia miscegenation statute, holding that the constitutional issue raised by the statute was not "properly presented." 350 U.S. at 985. The
Court's action not only ignored the holding of Brown but constituted a refusal to exercise
mandatory appellate jurisdiction assigned to the Court by statute. Accordingly, Naim v. Naim
has been the target of considerable criticism. See, e.g., Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Virtues" - A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. I,
11-13 (1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
34 (1959) (terming dismissal of appeal "wholly without basis in the law"). But see A. BICKEL,
supra note 14, at 71 & n.30, 174 (arguing that Naim v. Naim was a prudent accommodation of
principle and political expediency). The Court's dismissal is understood to have been a concession to perceived majoritarian pressure in the post-Brown era, where it had been asserted that
school desegregation would lead to "mongrelization of the race." See id. at 174. See generally
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-58, 68
GEO. L.J. 61-67 (1979). The Virginia statute was finally invalidated 11 years later in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). At that time, only 16 states had miscegenation laws, as opposed to
the time of the Brown decision, when more than half the states had such statutes.
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the level of politics at which Brown was decided - it is easy to
imagine the existence of a national coalition that supported the Brown

-

decision. Professor Bell first hypothesized that Brown was decided the
way that it was because it marked the point of convergence for three

national interests. 14 The decision advanced the international objectives of foreign policy interest groups by reducing the embarrassment
and competitive disadvantage that domestic racism produced in our
competition with communism for influence over third world nations.
The decision also advanced the interests of disillusioned post-War

blacks who seemed to be missing out on all of the equality that the
United States claimed to have been fighting for in World War II. In

addition, the decision advanced the interests of whites who saw segregation as an impediment to the economic maturation and development

of the South. 141 Professor Dudziak, in an article entitled Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,1 4 2 further developed the idea that
Brown was a response to national majoritarian interests, emphasizing
the particular interest suggested by her arresting title.1 43 Just as the
victorious northern coalition was able to impose civil rights enact-

ments on the South after the Civil War in order to advance its own
political interests, a similar national coalition was able to impose
Brown on the South in order to advance its political interests.
Not only does the existence of a national coalition provide a plausible account of the Brown decision, but the durability of that coalition
coincides with the success that minorities have had under Brown and
its progeny. When the first Brown decision was issued, the Court set
the case for reargument concerning the issue of remedy. 144 A year
140. See Bell, Brown and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, in SHADES OF Brown: New
Perspectives on School Desegregation 91-106 (D. Bell ed. 1980).
141. Id. at 96-97. Professor Bell also suggested that moral and economic considerations
might have played a role in the coalition that he was postulating. Id. Although he did not
explicitly claim that the Supreme Court was incapable of countermajoritarian acts, Professor Bell
did offer the following "principle" to account for the Brown decision:
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it
converges with the interests of whites; however, the fourteenth amendment, standing alone,
will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the
remedy sought threatens the superior societal status of middle- and upper-class whites.
Id. at 95 (emphasis omitted). This caused Bell to conclude that the remedies for Brown would be
co-extensive with white support, id. at 98-102, something that is consistent with the present
thesis. See infra text accompanying note 146.
142. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
143. Professor Dudziak notes that the U.S. Department of Justice filed an amicus brief
stressing the importance of a decision invalidating segregation because "[t]he United States is
trying to prove to the people of the world, of every nationality, race and color, that a free democracy is the most civilized and most secure form of government yet devised by man." Id. at 65
(brackets in original).
144. 347 U.S. at 495 ("Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of
this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in
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later, in Brown II, the Court ruled that although school desegregation
need not be immediate, it had to be accomplished with "all deliberate
speed," 145 thereby giving both school officials and the Court itself
some latitude in implementing the decision. For the next fifteen years,
most of the Supreme Court school desegregation decisions were resolved in a manner that was considered favorable to minority interests.
All of those decisions involved southern school districts. In the early
1970s, when school desegregation cases involving northern cities began to reach the Court, the Court began to rule against the minority
interests. 146 This suggests that after fifteen years, the national coalition supporting Brown had broken down, in part because civil rights
had ceased to be an important international issue, and in part because
northern urban interest groups had withdrawn from the coalition after
they were asked to internalize the costs of desegregation that had previously been deflected to the South. In a sense, Brown was the perfect
veiled majoritarian decision. The majority garnered rhetorical benefits
that were important at the time the decision was issued and that continue to be important today because of the manner in which they enhance the majority's self-image. Practical implementation of the
decision, however, continued only as long as, and only to the extent
that, Brown itself continued to command durable majoritarian
support.
Brown and the cases implementing it can be understood as the
product of a majoritarian coalition that advanced the immediate interests of racial minorities. It is unclear, however, whether membership
in that coalition served to advance long-term minority interests. Professor Seidman has argued that Brown in fact advanced white
majoritarian interests at the expense of long-term minority interests.
By overruling Plessy and declaring that separate-but-equal treatment
of racial minorities violated the Constitution, Brown saved the majority from a Plessy-based obligation actually to extend equal treatment
to minorities.1 47 Today, as a result of property-based tax structures
and tax subsidies given to private schools, white students receive a
significantly larger share of the governmental resources allocated to
these cases presents problems of considerable complexity.... In order that we may have the full
assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket .... ").
145. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
146. See G. STONE, supranote 11, at 482-88. Although the ultimate point made in the text is
valid, the actual pattern of southern victories and northern losses is not as tidy as the text suggests. For a more precise account see D. BELL, supra note 137, §§ 7.4-7.8.
147. See L. Seidman, Brown and Miranda (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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education than minority students receive. 148 Ironically, this may well
have been unconstitutional under Plessy's separate-but-equal doctrine.
Brown, however, makes this differential treatment constitutionally permissible. As long as a school district is not engaged in de jure segregation and has taken the requisite steps to eliminate the effects of any
past de jure segregation in which it may have been engaged, its constitutional obligation has been satisfied. Because neither of these obligations entail anything resembling equal treatment, the majority is better
off - and racial minorities are worse off - than would have been the
case under a faithfully implemented separate-but-equal standard of

constitutional law. 149 Moreover, to the extent that Brown has made it
constitutionally difficult for the government to rely upon race-based

classifications, Brown has disadvantaged minorities by depriving them
of effective affirmative action remedies. Race-conscious remedies,
such as minority set-asides, are being invalidated by the Court on constitutional grounds with increasing frequency, and they are being invalidated for the stated reason of preventing unfairness to whites. 150
In addition, disillusionment with the results of Brown has caused some
minority activists to advocate separate minority-controlled schools for

minority children.' 5' If one assumes that such a strategy is in the
present best interests of minorities, Brown has again adversely affected
minority interests by making that strategy constitutionally impermissi-

ble. If one further assumes that the majority itself benefits from the
preclusion of minority-controlled minority schools, Brown has again

advanced majoritarian interests at minority expense.152
148. See, eg., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding
constitutionality of property tax public school financing despite drastic discrepancies in funds
allocated to white and minority students).
149. See L. Seidman, supra note 147. This is not to suggest that a veiled majoritarian Court
could not have contained the damage to majoritarian interests that would have been done by a
separate-but-equal standard just as the Supreme Court was able to contain the damage done by
desegregation under Brown. However, to the extent that Supreme Court tolerance of the differential treatment presently accorded minority and nonminority children in education would have
been more difficult to justify under a separate-but-equal standard, the interests of racial minorities may have been disadvantaged by Brown.
150. See, eg., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 720-23 (1989) (invalidating minority set-aside program in construction industry because of adverse impact that program
had on whites).
151. See, e.g., Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, in SHADES OF BROWN: New
Perspectives on School Desegregation, supra note 140, at 124; Edmonds, Effective Educationfor
Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or Confirmed, in SHADES OF BROWN. New Perspectives on
School Desegregation, supra note 140, at 109. See generally D. BELL, supra note 137, § 7.10
(stressing that eliminating segregated schools has often not resulted in equal educational opportunities for minorities).
152. Such a benefit to the majority could ensue, for example, by preventing minority children
from escaping majoritarian control of a significant part of the attitude and value formation process to which children are exposed. Cf. Edmonds, supra note 151.
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The selective political sensitivity of the Supreme Court suggests
that political use of the Court cannot be optimized through reliance on
the same strategies that are used before the representative branches,
which are directly political. Supreme Court politics is more subtle and
sophisticated. Because it is not easy to identify with precision the
political issues that are sufficiently durable or intense to gain a
favorable reception from the Court, the success of a Supreme Court
political strategy will require well-developed political skills and prudent political judgments. Brown may well illustrate that careful use of
such skills and judgments will permit racial minorities to make profitable use of the Court as a political institution. Or, alternatively, Brown
may illustrate only that mastery of Supreme Court politics is so elusive
that even seeming victories will ultimately mask long-term defeats. In
light of the uncertainties involved, it makes little sense to try to develop a list of rules that minorities should follow in using the Court for
political purposes. It does, however, make sense to develop an appreciation of the risks that are entailed in attempting political use of the
Court, because those risks can be substantial.
IV.

THE RISKS OF SUPREME COURT POLITICS

Minority efforts to make political use of the Supreme Court pose
two types of risks. First, minorities risk misallocation of their political
capital, both among branches of government and across political is-

sues. This risk, although potentially serious with respect to any particular issue, is relatively insignificant with respect to the overall status of
racial minorities in the society at large. Second, in attempting political
use of the Supreme Court, minorities may legitimate the rights-based
assumptions of the traditional model and thereby perpetuate the status
of minorities as Supreme Court dependents who lack the capacity for
political self-determination. This risk does affect significantly the
overall social status of racial minorities.
A. Misallocation Risks

The political model of the Supreme Court developed thus far suggests that political issues having either durable or intense majority
support can be expected to prevail before the Court. Other types of
political issues will fare better before the representative branches. Because minorities will have differential rates of success before the respective branches, depending on the nature of the particular issue
under consideration, minorities are in danger of allocating political resources to the wrong branch of government. When the preferences of
the representative branches and the Court coincide, the dangers of
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misallocation are minimal because either institution will ultimately
produce the same result. Moreover, the two institutions can be used in
tandem so that their actions will be mutually reinforcing. 153 Misassessing the nature of a political issue in such circumstances poses the
danger of inefficient allocation of political capital, 154 but this will affect
the ultimate outcome only in marginal cases where a limited supply of
political capital is exhausted before an otherwise available victory can
be secured. By hypothesis, preferences intense enough to prevail
before the Court will also prevail before the representative
branches.15 5 In many instances, the transitory preferences of ordinary
representative branch politics will also correspond to the durable preferences of Supreme Court politics, so that the dangers of misallocation
156
will remain minimal.

Where the transitory preferences of the representative branches

and the durable preferences of the Court coincide, but both preferences work to the disadvantage of minority interests, the costs of misallocation are higher. Because minority interests will not prevail in

either forum, any political capital expended on such an issue simply
will be wasted. In such circumstances, the danger is one of misalloca-

tion among issues rather than branches of government. Political miscalculations can cause minorities to devote political resources to issues

on which they cannot prevail rather than to issues on which they can.
Although the costs of this type of allocation error are high, the error is

often avoidable because many readily identifiable issues have no future

1 57
before any branch of government.

153. For example, Congress can be lobbied to enact legislation that will advance a minority
interest, and the Court can then be petitioned to issue an expansive interpretation of the legislation that will maximize the statutory benefit. Similarly, the Court can be asked to endorse a
minority interest, and the president can then be lobbied to make enforcement of the Court's
decision a high priority.
154. In some cases, although the minority interest will prevail before either the representative branches or the Court, it may be faster, easier, and politically less expensive to concentrate
efforts on one branch rather than the other.
155. Presumably this is what happened in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
156. For example, such correspondence was present in some of the school desegregation remedy cases, where race-conscious remedies could be obtained either from the court or from the
school board itself. See, eg., McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971) (upholding school board
use of race-conscious pupil assignment to remedy past discrimination); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding district court use of race-conscious
pupil assignment to remedy past discrimination).
157. For example, strong arguments can be made that proportional representation is in the
long-term best interest of racial minorities. See, eg., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE
ELUSIVE QuEsT FOR RACIAL JUSTcE 75-101 (1987). However, there is no significant political
movement seeking to implement a proportional representation scheme in the United States either
through legislative or judicial action, because the issue is not perceived to correspond to the
current preferences of any branch of government.
Other issues can be more difficult to characterize. Although some evidence may exist that a
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Perhaps the most costly form of allocation error is the error that
can be made when the transitory preferences of the representative
branches and the durable preferences of the Court diverge rather than
coincide. In this situation, a minority interest will, by hypothesis, prevail before either the representative branches or the Court but not
before both. On one level, therefore, political miscalculations will be
more than inefficient, they will be outcome determinative. The resources expended before the wrong branch of government will simply
be wasted, and the opportunity cost of not proceeding before the
proper branch will deprive the minority of a victory that it could have
secured with more accurate political calculations. On a deeper level,
however, disagreement between the representative branches and the
Court about proper resolution of the issue may preclude attaining a

stable victory before any branch of government. Separation of powers
permits only those preferences that all three branches of government
share simultaneously to survive the policymaking process. Consistent

with this theory, competing interest groups have the ability to cause
the representative branches and the Court to work at cross purposes.
A group seeking to advance its political interests will not only have to
fight offensive battles before a sympathetic branch of government but

will have to fight defensive battles before an unsympathetic branch as
well.158 As a result, the costs of political action with respect to an

issue about which the representative branches and the Court disagree
will be higher than the costs associated with an issue about which the

branches agree.159 In addition, when the branches disagree, whatever
victories minorities secure will be transient, unreliable, and even illuparticular issue commands the support of one of the representative branches, that support may
be illusory, in that it is contingent on the lack of support that the issue has before another branch.
For example, passage of the D.C. Voting Rights amendment, H.R.J. Res. 554, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 92 Stat. 3795 (1978), and perhaps the Equal Rights amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972), may have occurred only because Congress assumed ratification by the states to be impossible. Other apparent support may simply be dishonest. For example, although President Bush has stated that he favors a balanced budget amendment, see The
PresidentialDebate: Transcriptof the Second Debate Between Bush and Dukakis, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 14, 1988, at A14, col. 1, it is unlikely that he really does.
Matters can become even more complicated if one views political responsiveness as something
that can be cultivated by interest group activity. The pertinent question then becomes whether
political capital ought to be invested in an issue, even though it has no present likelihood of
prevailing, in order to plant the seeds of future political receptivity that will permit a victory at
some later date. Because it is difficult to determine when such a strategy can be followed sensibly, allocation errors committed at this level of subtlety are probably common.
158. For example, the Court can invalidate or narrowly construe legislation that minorities
secure from Congress, or the president can engage in lax enforcement of minority victories obtained from the Court, or Congress can limit the jurisdiction of the Court in areas of minority
concern or deny the funding necessary for minorities to implement a Supreme Court victory.
The inefficiency of checks and balances was purposely built into the Constitution by the Framers.
See supra text accompanying and following notes 11-12.
159. Because both proponents and opponents of an issue will perceive the ability to prevail
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sory, as gains and losses are variously dispensed by the different
branches of government. Political expenditures made in connection
with issues about which the representative branches and the Court disagree may, therefore, consume large amounts of political capital but

yield no appreciable return.
All of this suggests that the highest priority for minorities ought to
be avoidance of political involvement in issues where the minority interest is identifiably disfavored by both the representative branches
and the Court, because political expenditures made on such issues simply will be wasted. The next highest priority ought to be political investment in issues with respect to which both the representative
branches and the Court are receptive to the minority interest - that
is, issues involving intense popular preferences and issues supported by
both transitory and durable preferences. Where the preferences of the
representative branches and the Court diverge, the strategic implication is more counter-intuitive. In such circumstances, interest groups
naturally tend to invest the bulk of their political capital in the branch
of government that they deem most receptive to their position on the
issue under consideration. 16 0 This natural inclination, however, may
be a bad one. The need to proceed simultaneously before multiple
branches of government necessitates the expenditure of large amounts
of political capital that may turn out to be a dead-weight loss. Moreover, cases like Brown suggest that even apparent victories may turn
out to be long-term losses. 161 Perhaps the proper minority response to
before at least one branch of government, each will make a larger political investment in that
issue than either would make if all three branches favored the same resolution.
160. For example, after the Supreme Court decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), which arguably narrowed the scope of the constitutional right to
abortion services, pro-choice interest groups made a strategic decision to announce that the
Supreme Court was no longer receptive to pro-choice interests and that the representative
branches were the forums to which the abortion struggle should be transferred. Immediately
after issuance of the decision, Molly Yard, president of the National Organization for Women,
asserted "[o]ur only choice now is to go right to the people." Enright, Keyword: Abortion, States
News Serv., July 7, 1989 (available through NEXIS). The NationalJournal reported a variety of
tactical changes that occurred shortly after issuance of the decision. Abortion rights activists
began to run full-page advertisements in the New York Times and the Washington Post, and
began to run radio and television messages. In addition, the National Abortion Rights Action
League, the National Organization for Women, and the Planned Parenthood Federation of
America hired pollsters, media consultants and experienced political operatives. Advocacy
groups redirected many of their resources to state legislative battles. See Matlack, Mobilizingfor
the Abortion War, 21 Natl. J. 1814, 1814 (1989).
161. See supra section III.B. Some commentators have argued that erroneous branch-selection determinations have also frustrated pro-choice interests on the abortion issue. Rather than
choosing to proceed incrementally before the representative branches, pro-choice advocates
chose to proceed before the Supreme Court. This strategy resulted in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), which made the pro-choice advocates' branch selection appear to have been correct. It
may be, however, that the choice to proceed before the Court was, in fact, ill-advised because it
provided a rallying point around which anti-abortion forces could coalesce and enhance their
political power. A well organized anti-abortion movement may never have developed if the pro-

2022

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:1971

a divergence in preferences between the representative branches and

the Court is simply to take the issue about which those preferences
diverge off the agenda of current minority issues, and to allocate mi-

nority political capital to other more promising issues. That strategy,
however, seems sufficiently self-defeatist and counter-intuitive that it is

difficult to imagine it being implemented with any degree of conviction. 162 In the final analysis, ordinary politics is a complicated business, which the added complexities of Supreme Court veiled

majoritarianism may render simply unmanageable. In any event, the
existence of Supreme Court participation in this political process poses

a fairly high risk that minority political resources will at some point be
misallocated.
B. Legitimation Risks
The second risk posed by the existence of Supreme Court politics is
the risk of legitimating the assumptions about the legal system that
underlie the traditional model of judicial review. Unlike the misallocation risk, whose potential harm is by and large limited to particular
issues in the minority agenda, the dangers attendant to the legitimachoice interests had chosen instead to proceed before the representative branches. See Tushnet,
Rights: An Essay in Informal Political Theory, 17 PoLs. & Soc. 403, 412 (1989). One does not
have to accept this assertion in order to appreciate its plausibility, and to appreciate the implications that it has for the existence of imponderables in a political process involving the Supreme
Court.
162. This, of course, poses a classic prisoner's-dilemma problem. Although both proponents
and opponents of an issue would profit by mutually taking the issue off of their respective agendas, neither is likely to do so because of the disadvantage that would result from doing so unilaterally.
Things are, of course, more complex than my reductionist depiction would suggest. Success
before one branch of government may be so dependent upon events occurring before another
branch that it means very little to ask in the abstract whether the interest of the representative
branches and the Court diverge or coincide, or whether one branch is likely to be more receptive
than another to a particular issue. In addition, an issue may be so important to a racial minority
that the decision to make it a low-priority agenda item simply lacks political viability. Moreover,
the degree of success that a minority group has with respect to a particular issue, before a particular forum, at a particular time, in a particular political climate can increase or decrease the
overall political capital that the group is perceived to have at its disposal. This may make political expenditures devoted to that issue rational even if a victory is shortly to be undermined by a
defeat before another branch of government.
Factors such as these make the political process more, not less, complex than the rudimentary
process I have described. For example, I must admit that I am occasionally drawn to a political
strategy that includes efforts to implement a system of proportional representation. It is not
clear, however, whether such a strategy should be rejected as one that is inconsistent with both
durable and transitory preferences, or whether it is one that presently should be pursued in order
to advance its likelihood of future success. See supra note 157. Nor is it clear how one could
ever know which view was correct. The political assessments and judgments called for under
even the rudimentary political model that I have described are so subtle and overdetermined that
the model is useful more for its capacity to illustrate the complexities of a political process in
which the Supreme Court is a player than for any practical guidance it provides concerning how
best to use that process.
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tion risk can adversely affect the overall social status of racial minorities, both in the eyes of the majority and in the eyes of racial minorities
themselves. Legitimating the assumptions of the traditional model can
perpetuate the view that racial minorities are incapable of self-determination, and that they must therefore subsist on Supreme Court largess.
Legitimation is the process by which a social practice or status
comes to be viewed as appropriate under a set of generally agreedupon governing criteria. 163 For example, when a criminal defendant is
convicted after a fair trial, the conviction is viewed as legitimate, even
though the jury may have been unknowingly mistaken in its conclusion about the defendant's guilt. Because we realize that ultimate accuracy is elusive, we are forced to settle for procedural regularity,
seasoned with good faith and best efforts, as the basis for judging the
appropriateness of a criminal conviction. The criteria governing the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system emanate from a shared moral
theory whose tenets are difficult to specify with precision. Despite this
difficulty, we tend to believe the governing criteria are satisfied by the
criminal justice system's insistence on good-faith procedural regularity. Indeed, it is precisely the process of legitimation that permits us
to view the criminal justice system as morally appropriate even though
we cannot articulate the governing criteria, and even though more
careful scrutiny would almost certainly leave us skeptical about its
legitimacy. 64
The process of legitimation works best when its operation is undetected, because the results of the process can then be transmitted without ever being scrutinized. Consider the phenomenon of hypnosis.
The fabled post-hypnotic suggestion derives its power from the amnesia that the hypnotist induces concerning the hypnotic process. Because the subject of the hypnosis is unaware of the process by which
his or her hypnotically influenced beliefs were acquired, the subject
accepts those beliefs with a degree of unthinking conviction that would
never be possible if the actual origin of those beliefs were to become
known. Similarly, the legitimation process owes its effectiveness to the
163. For a general discussion of the phenomenon of legitimation, on which the present discussion is based, see M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 262-95 (1987). Professor Kelman develops a model of legitimation that is more elaborate than is necessary for
present purposes, but is nevertheless quite provocative. For a more skeptical discussion, suggesting that the legitimation phenomenon may not be as well founded as many commentators
seem to believe, see Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology ofLaw, 1983 WIs. L.
REv. 379. The Kelman model also offers responses to Professor Hyde's reservations. See M.
KELMAN, supra, at 262-68.
164. For a demonstration of such scrutiny and a taste of the skepticism that it can generate,
see Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591
(1981), which is discussed in M. KELMAN, supra note 163, at 286-90.
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surreptitious nature of its operation.165
The legitimation process evades detection through the technique of

distraction. Arguments always rest upon underlying assumptions, but
when one's analytical attention is focused on the intricacies of an argu-

ment, the underlying assumptions on which the argument rests may
completely escape scrutiny. This is particularly true where the argu-

ment concerns a controversial topic. The controversy itself serves to
increase the level of distraction, thereby also increasing the likelihood
that underlying assumptions will be overlooked. The legitimating ef-

fect of rape laws provides an example. Professors Dworkin and
MacKinnon have argued that rape laws legitimate assumptions about

women that reinforce their status as objects of male sexual exploitation. 166 While vigorous arguments are exchanged concerning the
meaning of controversial issues such as the nature and scope of a wo-

man's consent, the debaters implicitly accept the underlying assumption that male-drafted rape laws properly can determine the

circumstances under which women can be forced to submit to sexual
intercourse. 167 The distraction legitimates the assumption by causing
the assumption to be accepted without scrutiny.

Simplistic versions of legitimation theory depict legitimation as a
tool of the elites who are in power to trick the masses into permitting

them to remain in power. For the same reasons that legal doctrine
cannot be counted on to generate only one predictable result, legitima165. My psychiatrist friends insist that the phenomenon of hypnosis is much more complex
than the process I have described. Although this is undoubtedly correct, my use of hypnosis is
intended to be metaphorical rather than technically accurate.
166. See A. DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 77-80, 85-87 (1983); MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward FeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNs 635, 638-39, 643-44,
647-55 (1983); M. KELMAN, supra note 163, at 285.
167. If the point seems trivial or artificial, consider that the legal system does permit men to
engage in forcible intercourse with women. As a de jure matter, forcible intercourse is permitted
by husbands, who in most jurisdictions lack the legal capacity to commit rape. Husbands are
completely immune from rape prosecution in at least nine states. Ten states impose no restrictions on the ability of a wife to prosecute her husband for rape. In the remaining 31 states, rape
prosecutions against husbands are permitted in only a limited number of circumstances, such as
when the husband and wife are living separately under court order, or when divorce papers have
been filed. See S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 107-08 n.3 (1987).
As a de facto matter, forcible intercourse is permitted by social acquaintances, against whom
rape convictions are very difficult to obtain. A mid-1960s study showed that a jury was four
times more likely to convict a rape defendant in cases that involved extrinsic violence - i.e.,
guns, knives, or beatings - multiple assailants, or no previous relationship between the victim
and the assailant than in cases in which those factors were absent. See id at 4-5. Professor
Estrich has concluded that the relationship between the victim and the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the initial encounter dictate the outcome in most rape cases. A review
of New York City district attorney files indicated that, although 67% of reported rape cases
involved acquaintances, in only 7% of those cases were indictments issued. See id. at 18. In
addition, juries appear to be prejudiced against the prosecution in rape cases, and will strain to be
lenient toward defendants if there is any suggestion of "contributory behavior" on the part of the
victim, which includes hitchhiking, dating or talking to men at parties. See id. at 19.
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tion doctrine - assumptions about what surreptitious activities will
produce what societal outcomes - cannot be counted on to generate
only one predictable result either. Accordingly, descriptions of the legitimation process as conspiratorially instrumental do not have much
appeal. 168 A more sophisticated version of legitimation theory depicts
legitimation as the process by which beneficiaries of the present distribution of societal resources seek to convince those who do not benefit
that the social and legal systems responsible for the present distribution are basically fair and should not be replaced. Because the system
is fair rather than capricious, parties who receive less will not object to
redistribution of resources as rewards to those who comply with the
system's norms. This theory is less crass, but it is still too conspiratorial to have ultimate appeal. 169 A more appealing depiction characterizes legitimation as an essentially passive process that perpetuates the
status quo largely through inertia. Although the assumptions underlying the current system could easily be scrutinized and the unacceptable assumptions rejected if anyone ever thought to scrutinize and
reject them, typically no one ever does. Use of the system reinforces
itself because its underlying assumptions are too commonplace to be
questioned before they are used, and each use further increases the
strength of the assumptions so that subsequent questioning becomes
progressively less likely. Those who possess societal power are as captive to the unquestioned assumptions as those against whom societal
power is exercised. Rather than creating an instrumental threat, the
process of legitimation more subtly threatens the appropriateness of
1 70
the ways in which we conceptualize and perceive our situation.
The traditional model of judicial review legitimates unhealthy majority assumptions about racial minorities, as well as minority assumptions about themselves. 171 Supreme Court adjudication is a heavily
publicized distraction that focuses national attention on the cases that
are argued before the Court each Term. Lawyers focus on the complex and esoteric doctrinal issues to which the bulk of the adjudicatory
process is directed; nonlawyers focus on the controversial social issues
that will be affected by the Court's decisions, as those decisions and
168. This simplistic version is developed and rejected in M. KELMAN, supra note 163, at 26263.
169. This characterization too is developed and rejected by Professor Kelman. See id.
170. Professor Kelman has developed an elaborate "cognitive" model of legitimation. See id.
at 269-95.
171. For a discussion of legitimation addressed specifically to antidiscrimination laws, see
Freeman, Legitimizing RacialDiscriminationthrough AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview
of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. RaV. 1049 (1978), and Freeman, Antidiscrimination
Law: A CriticalReview, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). For a discussion of
how race itself can serve a legitimating function, see Crenshaw, supra note 62, at 1370-81.
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their likely impact are popularized in the national press. For both,
analytical attention is successfully deflected from important assumptions that underlie the concept of countermajoritarian judicial review.
The traditional model rests on three assumptions that are necessary to
the coherence of countermajoritarian review: first, that there exists a

category of individual or substantive rights that the majority cannot
legitimately abridge; second, that the Supreme Court can legitimately

resolve ambiguities that inhere in the definition of those rights; and,
third, that minorities cannot legitimately make demands on the majority that exceed the scope of those rights. The traditional model legitimates these assumptions by placing them beyond active scrutiny.
Active scrutiny, however, could well cause those assumptions to be

rejected.
Countermajoritarian review depends upon the existence of sub-

stantive rights because without such rights, judicial invalidation of
majoritarian enactments would be undemocratic. 172 For over a decade, commentators along the periphery of mainstream legal scholar-

ship have in fact attempted to subject the substantive rights
assumption to closer scrutiny through what has come to be known as
"the critique of rights."' 173 Presently, however, the substantive rights
assumption has received little scrutiny by mainstream legal scholars
and virtually no scrutiny by anyone outside the fields of theoretical

academics to which rights theory is directly relevant. Although a
once-unquestioned assumption might be accepted rather than rejected
after subsequent scrutiny, the substantive rights assumption does not
seem to fit into this category. I suspect that many adherents to sub-

stantive rights theory are unfamiliar with the basic critique of rights,
172. Of course, democracy, too, legitimates a set of assumptions that scrutiny might render
unacceptable.
173. Stated succinctly, the critique of rights asserts that a concept of rights can never protect
a fundamental interest from political abridgement, because the contours of the fundamental interest can never be articulated in a manner that is sufficiently determinate to prevent its sacrifice
for reasons of political expediency. Just as the doctrinal indeterminacy discussed in Part I, supra,
undermines the traditional model of judicial review, the indeterminacy inherent in efforts to define fundamental rights undermines the ability of a political system to respect those rights in
troublesome cases. Moreover, a rights-based approach to the protection of fundamental interests
is counterproductive, because it legitimates the unstated assumptions on which particular claims
of right necessarily rest in a way that permits those assumptions to be used against the very party
asserting the claim of right. Finally, by limiting the scope of the discourse used to discuss social
problems, rights rhetoric inhibits the imagination of new ways in which social problems and
solutions can be conceptualized. See Tushnet, An Essay On Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363,
1363-94 (1984); Crenshaw, supranote 62, at 1350-56; Delgado, The EtherealScholar: Does CriticalLegalStudies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 302-07 (1987).
See generally Symposium: A Critique of Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363 (1984). For a sample of
the skepticism that this critique has produced concerning the continued utility of the concept of
rights, see Tushnet, supra note 161.
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and that many others misapprehend the nature of the critique. 174 The
continued allure of substantive fights theory seems attributable more
to the process of legitimation than to its acceptance after scrutiny.
Furthermore, if the substantive rights assumption were subjected to
serious scrutiny, it is unlikely that it could survive. It would be rejected for the same fundamental reason that Part I rejected the possibility of a countermajoritarian judicial capacity. A substantive right

cannot be defined in a way that precludes the possibility of
majoritarian abridgement through judicial interpretation. As a result,
a substantive right can only reflect a judicial decision about how a
particular dispute should properly be resolved, it cannot determine

that decision.
It is easy to understand why the majority would acquiesce in the
substantive rights assumption without scrutiny. The history of
Supreme Court judicial review indicates that judicial recognition of
substantive rights has typically served to advance majoritarian interests at the expense of the minoity. 175 It is more difficult to understand why minorities themselves have not been more receptive to the
invitation to rethink rights. A few minority commentators now seem
skeptical of the substantive rights assumption.1 76 Most minority commentators, however, sympathize with the critique of rights to some
degree, but caution against wholesale rejection of the one concept that
they believe has permitted minorities to obtain the few gains that have
been secured to date. 177 Still other minority commentators strenuously defend the rights-based system, even against the few minority
174. Professor Carrington, who has in a sense become the victim of frustrations both felt and
generated by the critical legal studies movement, see Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) (suggesting that members of the critical legal studies movement
should leave legal academics), is often accused of misunderstanding the arguments that he has
rejected. See "OfLaw and the River," and Of Nihilism and Academic Freedon 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1 (1985) (responses to Professor Carrington's suggestion). Whether or not this is true
with respect to Professor Carrington, the mere reflex acceptance of an assumption after only
nominal scrutiny would not be sufficient to avoid the dangers associated with the process of
legitimation. It is also true, however, that some of the commentators who have expressed skepticism about the critique of rights have a very sophisticated understanding of the critique. See
infra note 177 (citing representative commentators).
175. See supra section II.C.
176. See, eg., Bell, supra note 140, at 94-98. I interpret Professor Bell's recent advocacy of
proportional representation, see D. BELL, supra note 157, at 75-101, as a preference for political
over judicial solutions to race-related problems. Cf Cook, Beyond CriticalLegal Studies: The
Reconstructive Theology ofDr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REv. 985 (1990) (using
critique of rights as springboard for theological reconstruction of social hierarchy).
177. See, eg., Bracamonte, Minority Critiquesof the CriticalLegal Studies Movement: Foreword, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987); Crenshaw, supra note 62, at 1356-69, 1381-84;
Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435 (1987); Delgado, supra note 173;
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from DeconstructedRights, 22 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987); Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perilsand Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INEQUALITY 103 (1987).
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challenges that have been made to the substantive rights assumption.
They advocate reform but not abandonment of the present system.178
The fact that most members of racial minority groups embrace the
concept of substantive rights and resist efforts to abandon that concept
with varying degrees of vigor reveals how well the Supreme Court adjudicatory process has legitimated the substantive rights assumption.
The traditional model of judicial review also legitimates the assumption that ambiguities in the nature and scope of substantive rights
are to be resolved through exposition by the Supreme Court. Once
again, critical scrutiny could well cause that exposition assumption to
be rejected. If a concept of substantive rights were deemed to be desirable, political enforcement of those rights through the structural safeguards established by the Framers would seem to be more desirable
than Supreme Court enforcement. 179 The Supreme Court is mostly
white and mostly male, and, as an institution, it is mostly nonresponsive to fresh or innovative political thinking. 180 Moreover, the Court's
first two efforts to protect substantive rights from federal majoritarian
abrogation produced Marbury 18 1 and Dred Scott. 182 There may have
been a lesson in that. Part I of this article argues at length that the
inevitable political biases and predispositions of the homogeneous
Supreme Court cannot be prevented from dominating the judicial
decisionmaking process. As a result, scrutiny of the exposition assumption would be unlikely to result in its continued acceptance.
Once again, it is easy to understand why the majority, which typically
has benefited from Supreme Court control over rights, would feel no
pressing need to question the assumed appropriateness of that control.
But even minorities often feel compelled to defend the Court against
charges of racial bias or insensitivity.18 3 And again, this illustrates the
power of the legitimation phenomenon.
The third assumption legitimated by the traditional model is that
178. See, ag., T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY (1984) (criticizing contemporary civil rights movement for attempting to supplant goal of equal opportunity with goal
of equal political outcomes, which politicizes and thereby undermines neutral rule of law); cf.
Carter, The Best Black; and Other Tales, RECONSTRUCTION, winter 1990, at 6 (same); Kennedy,
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989) (rejecting argument that
criteria used to judge legal scholarship are race-dependent and arguing that neutral criteria do in
fact exist - something that implicitly accepts substantive rights assumption by endorsing belief

in determinate standards necessary for existence of such rights).
179.
11-12.
180.
181.
182.
183.

The Framers envisioned such political enforcement. See supratext accompanying notes
See supra section III.A.
See supra note 18.
See supra text accompanying notes 85-95.
See, eg., T. SOWELL, supra note 178; cf Carter, supra note 178; Kennedy, supra note
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minorities are not entitled to any more than what the Supreme Court
gives them in the process of protecting their substantive rights. Because the discrete and insular nature of racial minorities renders them
unable to participate effectively in the political process (so the argument goes), the political process need not take their desires seriously.
Moreover, because the Supreme Court is the specialist when it comes
to determining what degree of majority deference to minority interests
is appropriate, the representative branches are under no obligation to
make more concessions to minorities than the Court requires them to
make. As a result, any additional concessions that the political process does choose to make are gifts, emanating from majoritarian generosity, for which minorities should be grateful. However, if the
representative branches become too generous and make concessions
that the Court deems inappropriate, the Court itself will have to invalidate those concessions in order to protect the rights of members of the
majority race. Racial minorities, however, cannot complain about this
development because minorities themselves have forcefully insisted on
Supreme Court protection of substantive rights. If scrutinized, the assumption that Supreme Court concessions should constitute a ceiling
on the benefits to which minorities are legitimately entitled would almost certainly be rejected. The fourteenth amendment was enacted in
order to authorize legislative - not judicial - protection of minority
rights, thereby making it more than a little ironic for the Court to
invalidate majoritarian enactments under the fourteenth amendment
in order to protect majority rights. 184 In addition, for all of the reasons that the Court proved to be a dubious expositor of substantive
rights, it is also a dubious arbiter of disputes over the proper allocation
of societal resources. The allocation issue is inherently political. One
particular resolution cannot be more "legitimate" than another. Different resolutions simply represent different outcomes in a process of
pluralist political negotiations. For the same reason, a concession secured through the pluralist negotiation process should not be viewed
as a gift. The concession evidences no generosity, it merely reflects the
point along a continuum at which particular political interests
intersect.
The three assumptions legitimated by the traditional model ofjudicial review convey an artificial impression of the legal system. These
assumptions, however, also combine to project an invidious image of
racial minorities that is far more troubling. As envisioned by the
traditional model, racial minorities are not capable of protecting their
184. See G. STONE, supra note 11, at 444-51.
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own interests through the pluralist political process. Rather, their
welfare derives from the solicitude of the Supreme Court, whose dependents they seem destined to remain. Although not able to participate unaided in the political process, racial minorities nevertheless do
make occasional attempts to get more than they are legally entitled to
by appealing to the generosity of the representative branches. Further,
because the majority is in fact generous, minority requests for assistance are often granted. Racial minorities should be grateful for the
protection that they have received from the Court, and for the consideration shown them by the majoritarian branches. Rather than demonstrating their gratitude, however, minorities often appear
unsatisfied, unappreciative and shameless in their perpetual ability to
ask for yet another majoritarian concession.
That this legitimated vision constitutes a widely shared
majoritarian view of racial minorities is unfortunate. That it also constitutes a widely shared minority view is tragic.
At the close of an article of this type, the author customarily emphasizes that the way to escape the legitimated assumptions of the
traditional model, as well as the unfortunate vision of minorities that
those assumptions convey, is for minorities to embrace a political
model of the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court adjudicatory process can be viewed as simply one aspect of the larger political process,
the assumptions underlying the traditional model will no longer be
legitimated by minority use of the Supreme Court to advance minority
interests. Rather, political use of the Court will constitute an act of
minority self-determination, not an act of continued dependency. Minorities will finally have learned to place their faith in the representative branches of government that are institutionally capable of
respecting their interests, rather than the one branch whose design
compels it to retard recognition of minority claims of entitlement.
The reason that I have not endorsed the traditional ending is that,
in the present context, it is problematic. Political use of the Supreme
Court will legitimate the assumptions underlying the traditional model
as much as they are legitimated by purported countermajoritarian use.
In 8rder to be effective, political users of the Supreme Court will still
have to be good litigators. They will have to invoke precedents in
their briefs and pay homage to the justices in their oral arguments.
Moreover, because the justices themselves will continue to adhere to
the traditional model, minority advocates will also have to rely upon
rights rhetoric in order to formulate winning arguments. Minority li-
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tigators will not only have to employ the traditional mechanisms of
Supreme Court review, but they will have to feign allegiance to the
traditional model as well. From the outside, political and traditional
uses of the Supreme Court look precisely the same. As a result, political use of the Court by racial minorities will do nothing to undermine
the strength of legitimated assumptions in the minds of the majority.
Rather, it will simply constitute additional use of the Court that will
further reinforce the legitimated assumptions.
The only hope is that minorities themselves will attribute a different significance to Supreme Court litigation. The traditional model,
however, is deeply ingrained. The strength of that model can be experienced simply by trying to picture an acceptable social order that
does not incorporate a functioning concept of rights. Without considerable practice, most members of a liberal society find it difficult to
imagine, let alone favor, such a social order. The strength of the traditional model is ingrained in minority minds just as it is in the minds of
the majority. The legitimation process has been so successful that minorities may find it even more difficult than the majority to relinquish
it.185

Furthermore, because the dissonance generated by minority ef-

forts to feign sympathy for countermajoritarian review while believing
the process political will be at least substantial, if not overwhelming,
attempted political use of the Court will pose a constant threat, even
for minorities, of regression to the traditional model.
Rather than offering a prescription for remedial action, recognition
of the countermajoritarian fallacy simply poses an inescapable dilemma. Because Supreme Court review cannot successfully be
avoided, minorities have no alternative but to participate in a legal
process that reinforces the traditional model. And they must do so
even though the traditional model consigns them to a role of perpetual
Supreme Court dependency. Ironically, the very structure of American constitutional government, dedicating an entire branch to the protection of minority rights, seems designed to ensure ultimate
majoritarian control over minority interests and preclude racial minorities from ever securing the capacity for self-determination.
In a sense, it should not be surprising that a Supreme Court committed to the protection of minority interests would refuse to permit
minorities ever to escape its protective control. Under the Marburybased model of judicial review, minorities may be consigned to a role
of perpetual Supreme Court dependency. But minority dependence is
the lesser of the two dependencies that are created by the traditional
185. It seems that very few left-oriented political radicals are minority group members.
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model of judicial review. Under the Marbury model, if there were no
politically impotent minorities there could be no judicial review. And
without judicial review, the Supreme Court would be deprived of its
distinctive significance. Ironically, it is the Court that is ultimately
dependent on the continued vulnerability of minorities in order to sustain its own constitutional legitimacy. Once minorities are able to attain an appreciation of the power that they possess over the Supreme
Court, they will no longer be vulnerable to the supposed power that
the Court has over them. It is true that, as presently conceived, the
countermajoritarian dilemma can never be escaped. But by summoning the stamina, imagination, and ingenuity acquired through a history of oppression, racial minorities may be uniquely well-suited to
transcend it. Although minorities may not ultimately possess the
power to modify the manner in which the legal process deals with
their interests, they do have the power to modify what they think
about that process. And that may be just as good.
V.

CONCLUSION

The traditional model of judicial review cannot work. That model
posits the existence of a Supreme Court capable of protecting the interests of racial minorities by superseding the majoritarian preferences
that are socialized into the justices who sit on the Court. The mechanisms relied upon to ensure this countermajoritarian capability, however, are ineffective. Neither the formal safeguards of life tenure and
salary protection nor the operational safeguard of principled adjudication can insulate the Supreme Court process from majoritarian domination. Rather, the Court is a political institution that minorities must
treat politically if they are to use the Court to facilitate rather than
retard the advancement of minority interests. Effective political use of
the Court, however, is difficult for two reasons.
First, the operation of Supreme Court politics is subtle and complex. Because the institutional design of the Court makes it unsympathetic to progressive social change, the Court is more likely to impede
than to facilitate minority efforts to advance minority interests. Indeed, the subtleties and complexities of Supreme Court politics are
such that, if avoidance were possible, a rational minority strategy
would be to avoid the Supreme Court altogether and to concentrate
minority political efforts on the overtly political branches. Supreme
Court avoidance, however, is not An option. As a result, minorities are
compelled to make the best political judgments that they can in the
hope of using the Court to its utmost political advantage, recognizing
that the effort is not likely to be very successful.
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The second cause of difficulty in making effective political use of
the Supreme Court is that any use of the Court entails reliance on the
mechanisms and rhetoric of the traditional model. As a result, even
efforts by minorities to limit their Supreme Court participation to
political use will nevertheless legitimate the assumptions that underlie
the traditional model. Sadly, this includes the assumption that racial
minorities are Supreme Court dependents who are incapable of political self-determination. This poses an inescapable dilemma for minorities seeking to improve their social circumstances. Because the option
of simply ignoring the Court is unavailable, minorities are forced
either to acquiesce in the traditional model of judicial review or to
further legitimate that model through their political efforts to escape
it.
As a matter of constitutional theory, this leads to a rather interesting conclusion. It simply does not much matter whether the traditional model of judicial review is valid or not. Either way, minorities
will have to continue to behave as if the model works, and continued
minority reliance on the traditional model will reinforce majoritarian
beliefs in its essential validity. Ironically, however, minorities have it
within their power to understand the failure of the traditional model,
and the subtle power inversions that that failure entails. And the majority need never learn of their escape until it is too late.

